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A little over thirty years ago, in one of the most influential
commentaries on U.S. securities law, Milton Cohen posited a
simple but momentous observation: had the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act")' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act")2 been enacted in the reverse order, our system
of securities registration and disclosure would be entirely differ-
ent.' Enacted first, the Securities Act primarily concerns itself
with one corporate event: the issuance of securities. As a result,
the Securities Act is transaction-focused, requiring issuing com-
panies to make a number of company and transaction-specific
disclosures and to deliver this information to potential investors
through a rigorous and sometimes uncertain process.4 The peri-
odic disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act, on the other hand,
are triggered not by a particular transaction but by a company's
status. For instance, companies listed on a national securities ex-
change,5 or with a sufficiently large public following and asset
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Special thanks to Un Kyung
Park. I would also like to thank Douglas Baird, James Cox, Richard Epstein, Michael
Klausner, Donald Langevoort, Paul Mahoney, Tracey Meares, and Lynn Stout for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Russell Baker Scholars
Fund, the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund, and the John M. Olin Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged.
Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-38, 48 Stat 74, as amended by the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act, Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995), codified at 15 USCA
§ 77 (1981 & Supp 1996).
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-404, 48 Stat 881, as amended by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995), codified
at 15 USCA § 78 (1981 & Supp 1996).
' Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv L Rev 1340, 1341-42
(1966) ("lilt is my plea that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure system
having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the [Exchange] Act and treating
'[Securities] Act' disclosure needs on this foundation."). See also Milton H. Cohen, The In-
tegrated Disclosure System-Unfinished Business, 40 Bus Law 987, 987-88 (1985)
(arguing that Exchange Act should be considered more "basic" than Securities Act be-
cause of Exchange Act's wider and continuous scope).
" Section 5 of the Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e, governs this process. See
also text accompanying notes 125-30 (describing the registration process).
' See Section 13(a), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m(a) (specifying filing re-
quirements); Section 12(b), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 781(b) (detailing informa-
tion required for registration application). See also Section 3(aX1), Exchange Act, codified
at 15 USC § 78c(aXl) (defining "exchange" for the purposes of the Exchange Act).
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base,' are obligated under the Exchange Act to make annual and
quarterly public filings with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC").' In assessing the two regimes, Cohen recognized
that disclosures pursuant to a public offering under the Securi-
ties Act consist of information that all investors require prior to
making an investment decision, including not only those inves-
tors purchasing from the offering, but also those trading in the
secondary market. From this observation, Cohen called into
question the need for mandatory disclosures directed toward par-
ties of any particular transaction and argued for the reform of
the securities regime toward one, unified company-based infor-
mation disclosure scheme.'
Cohen's seminal article led the American Law Institute
("ALI) to draft a model federal securities code under the leader-
ship of Professor Louis Loss in the 1970s.' Embodying a company
registration system, the model code received final ALI approval
in 1980.'° Soon thereafter, however, the reform effort died;
' A company must register a class of equity securities (other than exempted securi-
ties) under the Exchange Act and accordingly satisfy the periodic reporting requirements
of Section 13(a) if(1) the company's total assets exceed $10 million and (2) more than five
hundred shareholders hold, of record, the non-exempt class of securities. Section 13, Ex-
change Act, codified at 15 USCA § 78m; Section 12(g), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USCA
§ 781(g) (exemptions). See also Rule 12g-1, 17 CFR § 240.12g-1 (1996), as amended by Re-
lief from Reporting by Small Issuers, SEC Exchange Act Release No 37,157, [Current]
Fed See L Rptr (CCH) 85,801 (May 17, 1996) (raising the asset requirement to $10 mil-
lion).
' Commonly referred to as "Exchange Act Reporting Companies," the companies
must file annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 10-Q, and occasional Form 8-K with the
SEC. See Section 13(a), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m(a); Regulation 13A, 17
CFR §§ 240.13a-1 et seq (1996) (providing rules on periodic disclosure requirements of
Exchange Act registered companies); Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, Exchange Act, 5 Fed Sec L
Rptr (CCH) 31,101-07 (July 10, 1996); I 31,031-35 (Apr 21, 1993); % 31,001-04 (Jan
25, 1995) (forms for periodic reports under Section 13). Companies filing a registration
statement that becomes effective under the Securities Act must also comply with the pe-
riodic reporting requirements. Section 15(d), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC §78o(d).
8 See Cohen, 79 Harv L Rev at 1341-42 (cited in note 3).
See ALI Federal Securities Code (1980). The SEC endorsed the ALI project twice, in
1980 and 1982. See Statement Concerning Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
SEC Securities Act Release No 6377, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) I
83,090 (Jan 21, 1982); Statement Concerning Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
SEC Securities Act Release No 6242, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 1
82,655 (Sept 18, 1980).
The SEC also looked into the possibility of moving toward a company registration sys-
tem immediately after Cohen's article was published during the 1960s, an investigation
that culminated in the Wheat Report. See generally Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong, 1st Sess
(Nov 3, 1977), in 1 Committee Print 95-29 (GPO 1977); Disclosure to Investors: A Reap-
praisal of Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts (Mar 27, 1969) ("Wheat Re-
port").
,o See ALI Federal Securities Code at vii (cited in note 9).
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through inaction, Congress chose instead to retain the current
dual transaction- and status-based framework." Recently, the
SEC renewed its interest in Cohen's thirty-year-old proposal and
initiated an investigation into the possibility of a more formal
shift toward a company registration system.' With Commis-
sioner Steven Walman as chair, the SEC's Advisory Committee
on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes ("Advisory
Committee") undertook this task.' After over a year of research
and consultation, the Advisory Committee released a report this
past July outlining the fundamentals of a new company registra-
tion system, as well as a pilot program to test the feasibility of
this system.'4
In the face of renewed interest in company registration and
the Advisory Committee's report, this Article argues that the
company registration system that Milton Cohen envisioned is-in
substance, if not in form-already largely in place within the
present securities regulatory framework. In 1982, for example,
the SEC promulgated several measures, introducing the inte-
grated disclosure system and allowing certain Exchange Act re-
porting companies to "incorporate by reference" information from
their Exchange Act filings into Securities Act registration docu-
ments.' Then in 1983, the SEC sought to reduce the registration
burden for Form S-3 issuers 6 through the adoption of shelf regis-
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate
Over Company-registration, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev 1143, 1145-46 (1995) ("[Wlhen the
ALIrs Federal Securities Code was presented to Congress in 1980, Congress essentially
yawned and declined to act. Unfortunately, 'good government' reform does not excite
powerful constituencies nor generate the level of emotion necessary to stir a lethargic
Congress into action.").
"Certain members of Congress are also interested in removing some of the restric-
tions within the Securities Act. See Mark H. Anderson, Republicans in House Begin Push
to Overhaul U.S. Securities Laws, Wall St J A2 (July 27, 1995) (noting that Representa-
tive Jack Fields introduced a bill that would "ease rules that require investors to get a
prospectus before making an investment").
"The Advisory Committee's report was released on July 24, 1996. Chaired by Com-
missioner Steven M.H. Walhman, the other members of the committee included John C.
Coffee, Jr., Barber B. Conable, Jr., Robert K. Elliott, Edward F. Greene, George N. Hat-
sopolous, A. Bart Holaday, Paul Kolton, Roland M. Machold, Burton G. Malkiel, Claudine
Malone, Charles Miller, Karen M. OBrien, and Lawrence W. Sonsini. See Securities and
Exchange Commission, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Processes, Fed Sec L Rep (CCII) No 1726 (Aug 5, 1996) ("Advisory Committee
Report").
" See Advisory Committee Report at 13 (cited in note 13). The pilot program would be
limited to those issuers with a $75 million public float, two years of reporting history, and
a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange or traded on the National
Market System of the NASDAQ Stock Market. Id at 28.
See text accompanying notes 248-56.
, A number of different registration forms are available to companies seeking to reg-
ister securities for a public offering. For domestic companies, Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
tration under Rule 415,17 providing S-3 issuers with the ability to
pre-register securities reasonably expected to be issued within
two years."8 These reforms recognized that for companies with
securities in an efficient market,19 investors already possess
much of the public information available to make an informed
investment decision."
A move toward a formal company-based registration system,
as advocated by the Advisory Committee, therefore may not be
necessary to achieve many of the substantive benefits of company
registration. To the extent the current system falls short of the
constitute the major categories from which companies may select. All companies may use
Form S-1, which requires complete registrant and transaction information disclosure.
However, only companies with three years of Exchange Act reporting experience may use
Form S-2 and thereby incorporate by reference registrant information contained in the
companies' latest Form 10-K. Form S-2 issuers must still, however, include a copy of the
annual report or comparable information within the prospectus. Only companies with at
least one year of Exchange Act reporting experience and meeting a minimum net capi-
talization requirement of $75 million (by nonaffiliates) may make use of Form S-3 for cer-
tain non-investment grade offerings, thereby allowing the issuer to incorporate-by-
reference to a greater extent than under Form S-2. Form S-3 issuers must include only
transaction-specific information on the offering. See Forms S-i, S-2, and S-3, Securities
Act, 2 Fed L Sec Rptr (CCH) $ 7121-26 (Jan 3, 1996) ("Form S-1"); %1 7141-46 (Aug 23,
1995) ("Form S-2"); 7151-55 (Jan 3, 1996) ("Form S-3") (explaining the requirements
for using each of the forms and the information required on each form and on accompa-
nying prospectuses).
" 17 CFR § 230.415 (1996).
"See Shelf Registration, SEC Securities Act Release No 6499, [1983-84 Transfer
Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) T 83,449 (Nov 17, 1983). The SEC, moreover, in 1992 fur-
ther loosened restrictions on shelf registration, adopting the "universal" shelf which al-
lows Form S-3 issuers to register a specified dollar amount of securities for the shelf
without allocating these securities to any particular class of securities. See Simplification
of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, SEC Securities Act Release
No 6964, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed See L Rptr T 85,053 (Oct 22, 1992).
"This Article uses the term "efficient market" to refer to a trading market that dis-
plays features of a semistrong efficient market. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J Fin 383 (1970) (providing a survey
of theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical testing of the efficient mar-
kets hypothesis). The semistrong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis posits
that the secondary market price of companies reflects all publicly available information
on the company. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
Securities Regulation, 98 Harv L Rev 747, 778-79 (1985). Not all economists, however, are
universal in their support for the efficient markets hypothesis. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U Pa
L Rev 851, 866-72 (1992) (describing various theories against the efficient markets hy-
pothesis).
See generally Renald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Mar-
ket Efficiency, 70 Va L Rev 549 (1984). At least one scholar, Professor Donald C.
Langevoort, argues that the efficient markets hypothesis had less influence on the inte-
grated disclosure system or shelf registration than did political forces. See Langevoort,
140 U Pa L Rev at 873-89 (cited in note 19) (arguing that the efficient markets hypothesis
was not a strong motivating force behind the SEC's adoption of integrated disclosure and
shelf registration).
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company registration ideal, reform within the current regulatory
framework more easily achieves the few benefits of the Advisory
Committee's proposed company registration system.
Furthermore, one alternative reform within the current sys-
tem provides greater simplification benefits, as well as substan-
tially all of the benefits of the formal company registration pro-
posal, and rationalizes fraud deterrence in the primary offering
context: status-based antifraud liability.2' As used in this Article,
status-based antifraud liability refers to a deterrence system that
imposes the same level of antifraud liability on an issuer re-
gardless of the type of primary transaction in which the issuer
engages; rather, the level of liability depends on the capitaliza-
tion and market following of the particular issuer.' A status-
based antifraud liability system provides two major benefits.
First, status-based antifraud takes advantage of market-based
mechanisms that deter issuers from committing fraud. To the ex-
tent these market-based mechanisms are stronger for more well
capitalized and followed companies, the value of additional anti-
fraud liability is reduced; likewise, where these market-based
mechanisms are weaker, a greater need is present for legal anti-
fraud deterrence. More analysts, for example, follow well capi-
talized companies, providing these companies less room to mis-
represent their value; furthermore, higher-quality securities pro-
fessional intermediaries acting as gatekeepers will tend to focus
on larger companies better able to defray the costs of screening
for fraud. Second, through status-based antifraud, the artificial
incentive for companies to employ a transaction exemption from
the public offering process is reduced. Currently, companies
through a private placement may reduce their antifraud liability
exposure as compared to the public offering process.' This in
21 Writing separately, three Advisory Committee members-John C. Coffee, Jr., Ed-
ward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini-call for a "corresponding transition in liabil-
ity rules" to accompany a shift toward company registration. Advisory Committee Report
at 36 (cited in note 13). They, however, focus almost entirely on clarifying the due dili-
gence requirements of underwriters, outside directors, accountants, and other gatekeep-
ers. Id at 36-41. Coffee has also written independently on moving toward a company reg-
istration system See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1155-72 (cited in note 11)
(discussing the merits of a company registration system).
' In this Article, the level of antifraud liability for information disclosures not in-
volving a primary transaction by the issuer is not directly covered. However, as discussed
in note 107, an argument exists that even in secondary market disclosures companies
should face a status-based system of antifraud liability.
Companies going through a public offering potentially face antifraud liability under
Sections 11 and 12(aX2) of the Securities Act as well as under Rule 10b-5. Private place-
ments, on the other hand, only must endure Rule lOb-5 antifraud liability. See Section
11(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(a); Section 12(aX2), Securities Act, codified
at 15 USCA § 771(aX2); Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1996).
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turn leads to a greater volume of exempt transactions and re-
stricted securities subject to the Securities Act's complex resale
limitation provisions. With status-based antifraud liability, the
magnitude of such restricted securities will diminish, resulting in
more fully registered and transferable securities and therefore
the same substantive benefits as with company registration.
Status-based antifraud also mitigates enforcement costs, focus-
ing resources on companies with the greatest risk of fraud and
the fewest market-based mechanisms to control that risk. Mov-
ing toward a status-based antifraud regime, moreover, would
leave most of the current system's existing framework in place,
avoiding the confusion inherent in shifting to a completely new
regulatory paradigm.24
In the present regulatory scheme, both the information dis-
closure and the level of antifraud liability are transaction-based.
Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, for example, provides anti-
fraud liability solely for material misstatements or omissions in
the registration statement of a public offering.25 Antifraud liabil-
ity under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, in turn, applies
only to prospectuses in the public offering context." Finally, Rule
10b-5 liability applies generally to all securities-related disclo-
sures, including those in private placements and Exchange Act
filings.27 The implementation of a status-based antifraud system
is straightforward: the level of antifraud liability for primary is-
suer transactions should turn on the status of the issuer and not
See text accompanying notes 43-70.
See Section 11(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(a).
See Section 12(a)(2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(a)(2) (1996). See also
Gustafson v Alloyd Co, 115 S Ct 1061, 1071-74 (1995) (limiting the reach of Section
12(aX2) to "public offerings [of securities] by an issuer (or a controlling shareholder)" in-
volving a prospectus "that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or control-
ling shareholder"). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77q(a), also
provides an additional antifraud provision for the sale of securities. Several circuit courts,
however, have held that private plaintiffs lack any private right of action under this pro-
vision. See In re Washington Public Power Supply Systems Securities Litigation, 823 F2d
1349, 1354-57 (9th Cir 1987) (en bane); Brannan v Eisenstein, 804 F2d 1041, 1043 n 1 (8th
Cir 1986); Landry v All American Assurance Co, 688 F2d 381, 391 (5th Cir 1982). But see
Kirshner v United States, 603 F2d 234, 241 (2d Cir 1978) (indicating that a private right
of action exists under Section 17(a)).
' Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1996); Section 10(b), Exchange Act, codified at 15
USC § 78j. See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal and Holme, Roberts & Owen, Securities
Law Handbook §§ 15.01-15.21 (Clark Boardman 1997) (summarizing the elements of a
Rule 10b-5 action).
Section 18 of the Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78r(a), provides an additional
antifraud liability provision for Exchange Act filings. Plaintiffs under Section 18, how-
ever, must prove actual reliance. As a result, scholars have deemed Section 18 a "dead
letter," providing no real risk of liability for issuers. See, for example, Cohen, 40 Bus Law
at 989 (cited in note 3).
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on the type of transaction. 8 Drawing from the current status-
based distinction made in the Securities Act registration forms,
this Article contends that where the issuer is a Form S-1 com-
pany, possessing little market experience and few market-based
deterrents against fraud, it should be subject to the most strin-
gent level of antifraud liability regardless of the type of transac-
tion it undertakes. Conversely, Form S-2 and S-3 issuers, who
are presumptively better followed and more highly capitalized,
should face lower levels of antifraud liability.
The Article proceeds in the following fashion. Part I presents
the arguments for a status-based antifraud regime and identifies
several alternative market-based antifraud mechanisms. Part II
provides a detailed analysis of recent efforts to shift more for-
mally toward a status-based company registration and disclosure
system. The Article argues that the Advisory Committee's rec-
ommendations, although appealing on a theoretical level, are
largely peripheral to creating a company registration system.
The Article supports this proposition by demonstrating that re-
forms instituted during the 1980s already introduced most of the
substantive benefits of a company registration system within the
Securities Act. Furthermore, those Advisory Committee recom-
mendations that more directly introduce a pure company regis-
tration system both are unsuitable for non-S-3 companies and
provide only incremental substantive changes to the current re-
gime. Part III analyzes the relationship between status-based
antifraud and company registration reform, arguing that status-
based antifraud liability achieves at a lower cost many of the in-
cremental benefits that company registration provides for the
current system.
I. STATUS-BASED ANTIFRAUD LIABILITY
Most of the recent debate regarding antifraud liability re-
form has centered around reforming procedural aspects of class
action litigation to limit the threat of nuisance suits.29 The result
' Several other scholars and observers have recently argued for company registra-
tion. No one, however, has called for a status-based antifraud liability regime. See Rob-
erta S. Karmel, Is Section 5 an Anachronism?, NY L J 3, 3 (Dec 21, 1995); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Is the Securities Act of 1933 obsolete? The SEC increasingly appears to believe so but
has not yet adopted a consistent policy to replace it., Natl L J B4 (Sept 4, 1995); Gerald S.
Backman and Stephen E. Kim, A Cure for Securities Act Metaphysics: Integrated Regis-
tration, Insights 18 (May 1995) (proposing an abbreviated registration method for select
companies that requires no prospectus or waiting period); Joseph McLaughlin, 1933 Act's
Registration Provisions: Is Time Ripe for Repealing Them?, Natl L J 44 (Aug 18, 1986).
A variety of theories exist to explain the ability of plaintiffs attorneys to bring suit
and successfully obtain settlements for claims that otherwise would not prevail at trial.
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of years of effort from reform advocates, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Litigation Reform Act")0 in-
creased the courts' role in monitoring for frivolous litigation and
provided institutional investors with a greater ability to take
control of plaintiffs' class actions." The Litigation Reform Act
also strengthened forward-looking informational safe harbors32
and instituted provisions replacing joint and several liability
with proportionate liability for certain securities fraud defen-
dants, including outside directors facing Section 11 Securities Act
liability and Rule 10b-5 defendants who did not knowingly vio-
late the securities laws.33
The goal of the Litigation Reform Act's largely procedural re-
forms is clear: to design a filter that allows meritorious claims of
fraud to proceed while blocking frivolous claims." To the extent
the Litigation Reform Act succeeds, it should be commended.
Empirical evidence does support the contention that much secu-
rities litigation before the Litigation Reform Act was frivolous."
See, for example, D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 3-4 (1985) (developing a formal model of
nuisance suits based on the plaintiffs' ability to exploit a significant initial cost advantage
in conducting a lawsuit); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer,
17 J Legal Stud 437, 437-41 (1988) (arguing that nuisance suits may bring positive re-
turns to plaintiffs where defendants are uncertain whether they actually face a nuisance
or meritorious suit).
Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995), to be codified at scattered sections of Title 15
of the United States Code (amending the Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
31 See Section 102, Litigation Reform Act, enacting Section 27A, Securities Act, codi-
fied at 15 USCA § 77z-2. See also Section 101, Litigation Reform Act, enacting Section
21D, Exchange Act, codified at 15 USCA § 78u-4. In August 1996, for example, the State
of Wisconsin Investment Board attempted to take control of a securities class action
against CellStar Corp. See Dean Starkman, Pension Fund To Test New Securities Law,
Wall St J B7 (Aug 8, 1996). See also Dean Starkman, Calpers Wins New Role in Suit
Against Grace, Wall St J B12 (Sept 12, 1996) (reporting that the California Public Em-
ployees Retirement System gained the lead role in a corporate waste suit against W.R.
Grace & Co.).
' See Section 27A, Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-2. See also Section 102,
Litigation Reform Act, enacting Section 21E, Exchange Act, codified at 15 USCA § 78u-5.
' See Section 201, Litigation Reform Act, enacting Section 21D(g), Exchange Act,
codified at 15 USCA § 78u-4. The amount of proportionate liability is measured as the
percentage of the total fault of all persons who caused or contributed to the plaintiffs loss
attributable to a particular defendant. Id at 21D(gX3XA). See also William M. Kelly, Cor-
porate Disclosure Practices After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 923
PLI(Corp 405 (1996) (considering the implication of the Litigation Reform Act's forward-
looking statement safe harbors on various forms of corporate communication).
' See House Floor Debate, H 2760-65, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 7, 1995), in 141
Cong Rec H 42 (Mar 7, 1995). Any procedural reform must also focus on allowing merito-
rious claims to proceed. Otherwise, the easiest method of eliminating all frivolous suits
would be to do away with antifraud liability altogether. Of course, to the extent any suits
are merit-based, this will also totally remove any securities law deterrent against fraud.
See generally James Bohn and Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market:
Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U Pa L Rev 903 (1996) (suggests
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Particularly for initial public offerings in certain industry groups
that involved relatively larger offering amounts, securities fraud
litigation was frequent and often suspect. 6 Frivolous litigation,
however, is not confined to initial public offerings but may affect
all types of securities market transactions. Issuers bear the pos-
sible expense of defending against frivolous litigation and set-
tling such claims;" issuers may also underprice their issues to
reduce the possibility of frivolous litigation, raising the cost of
capital.38 The specter of a nuisance suit may also chill a com-
pany's voluntary release of information into the market. Finally,
frivolous litigation weakens the deterrence against fraud; in the
extreme, where issuers face liability regardless of whether any
actual fraud occurred, antifraud liability no longer provides de-
terrence against fraud.
Regardless of the Litigation Reform Act's impact, frivolous
suits undoubtedly will continue to prove costly to all companies
considering issuing securities. Although still too early to evaluate
its overall effect, one recent study reports that the number of se-
curities fraud class actions has remained constant in federal
courts while state court filings have actually increased.39 More-
over, none of the Litigation Reform Act's procedural reforms pro-
vides a "magic bullet." For example, it is unclear whether height-
ening the role of institutional investors will greatly reduce the
incidence of nuisance suits. As with other purchasers in an of-
fering, institutional investors also gain from extracting settle-
ment money from the issuer after the issuer's stock price drops;
institutional investors, therefore, may only act to ensure that
plaintiffs attorneys share more of the windfall from nuisance
suits with the purchasers of the offering. Although plaintiffs at-
torneys may consequently have less incentive to bring nuisance
suits, their incentive is not eliminated and such suits may still
occur.
suits correlate with higher quality underwriters); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan L Rev 497 (1991)
(identifies non-merit-related outcomes in securities litigation settlements).
See Bohn and Choi, 144 U Pa L Rev at 940-43 (cited in note 35). This problem was
particularly salient in the computer industry. Id at 943.
' In 1993 dollars, the expected cost to issuers of securities antifraud litigation was
$145,000. Id at 981. Of course, not all litigation is frivolous; the direct cost of frivolous
litigation, therefore, may be somewhat less than $145,000.
See Seha M. Tinig, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J Fin
789, 798-800 (1988).
' See Dean Starkman, Securities Class-Action Suits Seem Immune to Effects of a New
Law, Wall St J B12 (Nov 12, 1996) (reporting that a National Economic Research Associ-
ates study found no decline in the number of securities class-action filings in federal
courts and a dramatic increase in state court filings after the Litigation Reform Act).
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Likewise, introducing proportionate liability for outside di-
rectors and Rule 10b-5 defendants while expanding safe harbors
for forward-looking statements may also reduce the expected
gain from a nuisance suit to plaintiffs attorneys. Where, how-
ever, those defendants still facing joint and several liability-
including non-outside director defendants under Section 11 and
Rule 10b-5 defendants who knowingly commit fraud4-possess
adequate financial resources, plaintiffs attorneys may still profit
from nuisance suits alleging fraud in statements not protected
under the forward-looking safe harbors. Even if such suits face a
lower probability of success at trial, plaintiff's attorneys will gain
from frivolous suits if defendants who are risk-averse or who
seek to avoid the cost, distraction, or embarrassing publicity of a
trial still choose to settle.4' Furthermore, those nuisance suits
with the highest dollar amounts at stake will provide plaintiffs
attorneys with the greatest return despite the reforms. Nuisance
suits may thus persist as a major cost of raising capital. Addi-
tional reforms, focused more on the substantive level of antifraud
liability, may prove necessary to curtail further the high cost of
nuisance litigation. '
This Article proposes a fundamental shift in the substantive
antifraud system toward a status-based antifraud regime for
primary offerings. Antifraud liability provides one deterrent
against fraud. To the extent that the probability of antifraud li-
ability increases as the quality of a company's disclosures de-
creases, companies will have more incentive to ensure high qual-
ity in their securities filings and information disclosures. For ex-
ample, companies that face a higher probability of a fraud suit
after releasing blatantly false information will take into account
the increased expected cost from such a suit when deciding
whether to engage in fraud.
Other mechanisms also work to affect the incentive of com-
panies and managers to make accurate and materially complete
disclosures. The impact of these other mechanisms turns directly
on the size and public following of the issuing company. Reform,
therefore, may take advantage of the efficient market-where it
exists-and other deterrents against fraud to tailor a more pre-
cise legal antifraud liability and thereby reduce the incidence of
frivolous litigation. Tailoring antifraud liability based on an is-
' See Section 11(f), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77k(f); Section 21D(gX2XA),
Exchange Act, codified at 15 USCA § 78u-4(gX2XA).
See note 29 (describing different theories of nuisance suit litigation).
4' See note 279 (noting that the Advisory Committee considered a number of different
antifraud proposals).
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suer's status will also reduce judicial administrative costs and,
because the frequency of nuisance litigation is diminished, para-
doxically encourage more high-quality issues. This Part (a) dis-
cusses the range of different companies that may contemplate is-
suing securities into the market; (b) examines the alternative an-
tifraud mechanisms which exist in this market; (c) proposes a
possible status-based antifraud system; and finally (d) refines
this status-based regime. Later Parts of the Article discuss the
relationship between status-based antifraud liability and recent
company registration proposals, arguing that status-based anti-
fraud liability alone substantively introduces features of com-
pany registration into today's securities regime.
A. Differentiating Companies
Today's antifraud regime applies the same level of antifraud
liability regardless of the size or market following of a particular
company. When a company such as General Motors ("GM"), for
example, conducts a seasoned offering and floats $100 million
worth of securities into the market with the assistance of several
brand name underwriting houses, GM bears the identical level of
antifraud liability-and thereby exposure to private litigation
risks-as smaller companies. For instance, hypothetical Central
Motors ("CM"), a recent startup that seeks an additional $10
million in capital through an initial public offering with the help
of its local underwriter, faces the same Section 11 level of liabil-
ity as GM. Although the level of due diligence defense may vary
depending on the type of company involved,' issuers do not enjoy
this defense and it is unclear to what extent due diligence re-
quirements actually do change for different companies." Like-
wise, Rule 10b-5 liability extends to all companies regardless of
size or market following: whether a fraudulent misstatement or
omission comes from GM or CM, plaintiffs must demonstrate the
same level of scienter, materiality, and other prerequisites to li-
ability."
,See Rule 176, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.176 (1996).
See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1175 (cited in note 11) ("At best, Rule 176 is an
ineffective provision, which appears never to have produced a pre-trial dismissal in a re-
ported case since its adoption more than a decade ago.").
"Proof of Rule 10b-5 liability may, however, differ for GM- and CM-type companies.
Plaintiffs suing GM may rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to presume reliance
while CM investors may not. See Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 241-47 (1988). This
makes it easier to pursue a Rule 10b-5 action against GM-sized companies; as this Article
discusses later, however, because GM faces more market-based antifraud deterrents than
CM-type companies, this is exactly the opposite allocation of legal antifraud liability that
investors would desire.
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In fact, a wide range of different companies exist in the mar-
ket between GM- and CM-sized issuers. Companies vary widely
in their operating history, the amount of capitalization they pos-
sess, the size of their liquid trading market, and the number of
professional securities analysts that follow the companies' prog-
ress and market valuation. At one extreme, large, highly capi-
talized companies issue securities that trade in efficient mar-
kets." At the other extreme, relatively small, low-market-
capitalization companies issue securities that trade in illiquid
markets. 7 These companies enjoy the attention of only a few
analysts, if any. Analysts and other securities professionals must
expend a fixed amount of resources learning about a particular
business and updating this information over time. If a company
lacks a large market capitalization and thereby trades in an il-
liquid market, the ability of analysts to make a return on their
information investment is limited, leading fewer analysts to fol-
low the company. Because trades occur infrequently and few
analysts exist to apply pressure on the market price of these il-
liquid securities, investors cannot rely on the secondary market
price to incorporate all public information concerning the com-
pany. Investors in inefficient market companies, therefore, must
turn to other sources of information in evaluating their invest-
ments or alternatively rely more heavily on the protections of an-
tifraud liability.
The Securities Act already partially takes into account the
range in the efficiency of trading markets for different compa-
nies' securities. Based on the likelihood that a company trades in
an efficient market, the SEC partitions companies seeking regis-
tration into three groups: those eligible for Form S-I, S-2, or S-3
registration.' Form S-3 companies must have engaged in at least
' See note 19 (describing the semistrong version of the efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis).
' Companies listed in the "pink sheets" over-the-counter market, for example, often
do not disclose any information to the SEC and rarely trade more than once a day. See
Amy Dunkin, Going For the Green in the Pink Sheets, Bus Week 82, 82-83 (Aug 19, 1996)
(describing the pink sheets market and providing investment tips).
Forms S-i, S-2, and S-3, Securities Act, 2 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 91 7121-26 (Oct 25,
1955); H91 7141-46 (May 24, 1982); 91 7151-55 (May 24, 1982) (instituting different regis-
tration forms for the three company types). See also Proposed Comprehensive Revision to
System For Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No 6235, 45 Fed
Reg 63693 (Sept 25, 1980) (proposing a three-tier registration framework). Small business
issuers may also register securities under Forms SB-1 and SB-2. See.Forms SB-1, SB-2,
Securities Act, 2 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) T 7312 (June 3, 1993); 7313-14 (Aug 13, 1992)
(creating separate registration procedure for companies with small business status). For-
eign issuers may also issue securities under Forms F-i, F-2, and F-3. See Forms F-i, F-2,
F-3, Securities Act, 2 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) T 6951-56 (Dec 4, 1982); T 6961-66 (Dec 4,
1982); TT 6971-74 (Dec 4, 1982) (creating separate registration process for foreign issu-
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one year of Exchange Act reporting and, for primary distribu-
tions of non-investment-grade securities, enjoy a market capital-
ization (by nonaffihiates) of at least $75 million, among other re-
quirements.49 Companies that meet the S-3 qualifications receive
the greatest presumption of efficient market status and may in-
corporate the largest amount of information by reference from
their most recent Exchange Act filings into the Securities Act
registration statement." Similarly, S-2 companies must have en-
gaged in at least three years of Exchange Act reporting, but do
not have to meet any market capitalization requirements." The
Securities Act therefore maintains a lower presumption of effi-
cient market status and consequently allows less incorporation
by reference.52 Finally, S-1 companies carry no presumption of ef-
ficient market trading and are consequently denied the ability to
incorporate by reference.53
The same efficient market rationale that supports incorpora-
tion by reference also justifies varying antifraud liability level by
the market status of companies. Companies with extensive mar-
ers). Although important, these alternate forms are not essential to the analysis of this
Article and are consequently not examined.
,9 See Form S-3 (cited in note 16).
Form S-3 issuers must include transaction-related information in the Form S-3
prospectus, involving information regarding the use of proceeds, the underwriters in-
volved in the transaction, the selling security-holders, the issue price and offering dilu-
tion, and other information related to the transaction. Outside of the transaction-related
information, S-3 issuers may incorporate almost all other information concerning the
company directly from Exchange Act filings. S-3 issuers, nevertheless, must update the
prospectus with material information not already in an Exchange At filing. See Form S-3
(cited in note 16). See also Bloomenthal and Holme, Roberts & Owen, Securities Law
Handbook § 5.05[1][a] (cited in note 27) (summarizing information and eligibility re-
quirements of Form S-3).
s, See Form S-2 (cited in note 16).
Form S-2 issuers must include the same transaction-related information as S-3 is-
suers in the Form S-2 prospectus. In addition, S-2 issuers must list basic company-related
information-including standardized financial statements, the management discussion
and analysis section, a brief description of the registrant's business, and market and divi-
dend information-in either the prospectus or separately in the latest annual report sent
with the prospectus to investors. Form S-2 issuers are allowed, however, to incorporate
by reference more detailed company-related information from Exchange Act filings. See
Form S-2 (cited in note 16). See also Bloomenthal and Holme, Roberts & Owen, Securities
Law Handbook § 5.05[1][al (cited in note 27) (summarizing information and eligibility re-
quirements of Form S-2).
Form S-1 companies must include-without incorporation by reference-all trans-
actional, basic company, and detailed company information in the prospectus. The de-
tailed company information includes a detailed description of the business, any legal pro-
ceedings involving the issuer, the officers and directors, transactions with management,
the security ownership of 5 percent beneficial shareholders, and executive compensation.
See Form S-1 (cited in note 16). See also Bloomenthal and Holme, Roberts & Owen, Secu-
rities Law Handbook § 5.05[1][a] (cited in note 27) (summarizing information and eligi-
bility requirements of Form S-1).
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ket capitalization and a large investment analyst following pos-
sess different incentives to engage in misleading disclosures than
smaller companies with shorter operating histories and less pub-
lic presence in the securities market. The next Section discusses
these market-based antifraud mechanisms, explains how these
market mechanisms vary with the capitalization of the issuer,
and examines how legal antifraud liability should respond to this
variation. Of course, the SEC's current S-i, S-2, and S-3 frame-
work only roughly captures the differences across companies.'
As a proxy for the degree of efficiency with which a company's se-
curities may trade, the framework may suffer from typical over-
and under-inclusion problems plaguing all bright-line rules. The
focus of this Article, however, is not on reforming the exact
breakdown of companies among different categories of efficiency,
but rather on taking into account these differences among com-
panies as applied to the operation and impact of antifraud rules.
Therefore, although somewhat arbitrary, the SEC's S-i, S-2, S-3
division is taken as given for the remainder of the Article. How-
ever, nothing in the analysis depends on this particular categori-
zation; what is important is that regulators understand that a
range of companies does exist regardless of the particular catego-
ries among which companies today are divided.
B. Market-Based Antifraud Mechanisms
Antifraud legal liability does not exist in a vacuum. When
deciding upon their disclosure strategy in the context of a pri-
mary transaction, companies must take into account not only the
prospect of antifraud legal liability but also market-based
mechanisms that deter fraud. Most companies do not issue mis-
leading disclosures or omit material information without some
financial reason to do so. In particular, companies (or their man-
agers) may wish to elevate artificially their share price either
during a public offering or other primary transaction. Managers,
in maximizing both their own welfare and the company's profits,
will consider (1) the availability of other contradictory public in-
formation; (2) the impact of fraud on their own personal reputa-
tions; and (3) the existence of reputational intermediaries who
may fail to corroborate the managers' disclosures.55 Each of these
See James D. Cox, Robert W. Hilhnan, and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regu-
lation: Cases and Materials 248-49 (Little, Brown 1991) ("Cox, Casebook") (noting that
many companies that qualify for Form S-3 nevertheless fail to receive much attention
from institutional investor or brokerage firm analysts).
Compare Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U Ill L Rev 691, 701-03 (arguing that
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mechanisms, as well as the importance of the market status of
the issuer involved, are discussed below.
1. Information constraints.
Investors evaluating the information disclosures from a
company take into account not only the represented value of the
offered securities and other disclosures from the company, but
other publicly available information as well. The investing public
can tap into a greater amount of information regarding the as-
sets, activities, and plans of larger companies with longer oper-
ating histories. Importantly, larger, well capitalized companies
also have a greater number of securities analysts that specialize
in assessing the value of these companies." Such analysts cor-
roborate the information released from the company and play an
important role in limiting the ability of managers to misstate the
value of their companies. In contrast, smaller, lesser known com-
panies have a greater ability to mislead the public. Little alterna-
tive public information may exist, for example, on small compa-
nies trading in the over-the-counter market.57 Moreover, few
analysts follow smaller, over-the-counter companies closely
enough to assess the company's information disclosures. 8 Such
"managers of ailing firms commit Fraud on the Market in an attempt to save their jobs,
by using the period of the fraud to turn the firm around").
' See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Re-
port, 15 Cardozo L Rev 837, 848 (1994) (providing statistics that institutional investors
held 23 percent of outstanding equity in the United States in 1955, 38 percent in 1981,
and over 50 percent in 1990); New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book for the Year 1995, at
57 (1996) (reporting that the percentage of U.S. equities held by U.S. pension funds alone
increased from 0.8 percent in 1950 to 22.2 percent by 1995).
" Unless over-the-counter companies have greater than five hundred shareholders of
a class of securities and net assets over $10 million or recently conducted a registered of-
fering, they will escape the Exchange Acts periodic reporting requirements. See Section
13(a), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m(a) (referring to Section 12, Exchange Act,
for definition of issuers required to file); Section 15(d), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC §
78o(d) (same); Section 12(g), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 781(g) (exempting issuers
with fewer than 500 shareholders of a class of securities and less than $1 million in as-
sets); Rule 12g-1, Exchange Act, 17 CFR § 240.12g-1 (1996), as amended by Relief and
Reporting by Small Issuers, SEC Exchange Act Release No 37,157, [Current] Fed Sec L
Rptr (CCH) 85,801 (May 17, 1996) (extending the exemption from the requirement to
file under Section 12 of the Exchange Act for companies with less than $10 million in as-
sets). Furthermore, smaller capitalized companies may have fewer incentives to release
information voluntarily into the market to the extent they trade only infrequently and
are followed by relatively few analysts.
Institutional investors, for example, accounted for nearly 74 percent of the trading
volume on the NYSE in 1988 but only 43 percent of the volume on NASDAQ. See Cox,
Casebook at 10 (cited in note 54) (citing Securities Industry Association Research De-
partment, Trends: An Analysis of Emerging Trends in the Securities Industry (1989)).
Moreover, some evidence exists that less than one thousand of the more than ten thou-
sand Exchange Act reporting companies are followed by one or more investment analysts.
The University of Chicago Law Review
companies, therefore, can more easily misstate their value. S-1
companies, for instance, are more likely to have a smaller market
following and less publicly available information compared to S-3
companies. For S-3 companies, therefore, antifraud legal liability
may result in a lower incremental reduction in fraud simply be-
cause the S-3 companies have less room to misstate their value
credibly. In contrast, because S-1 companies have much greater
leeway to make misrepresentations or omissions, legal antifraud
liability has a greater impact in deterring fraud by these compa-
nies.
Conversely, others may argue that small issuers with securi-
ties trading in an illiquid market actually attract more analysts
to the extent these analysts may obtain a greater return from
their research investment. Analysts may receive more from their
research investment because illiquid, small companies tend to be
priced relatively farther away from their true fundamental value;
uncovering an undervalued small company, therefore, may pro-
vide the analyst with a disproportionately large profit. Indeed, if
all markets were the same for all securities and all issuers, then
analysts would distribute themselves uniformly across all securi-
ties until the same level of price inefficiency existed. If this did
not occur, then some analysts would shift into relatively more
price-inefficient markets to obtain higher profits. However, not
all securities and issuers are the same. Larger companies with
more securities and capitalization have more sophisticated inves-
tors and analysts following them for several reasons. First, in-
vestment analysis of a company requires a certain fixed cost in-
vestment regardless of the market capitalization of the company;
therefore, an investment analyst is better able to spread the
costs of such research for companies with a greater capitaliza-
tion. Second, many sophisticated investors have short-term hori-
zons and therefore may not be willing to invest in an illiquid
market, even for undervalued securities. For such investors,
achieving a relatively quick short-term return is more valuable
than the potentially greater gain from a long-term investment to
the extent the long-term investment also places on the investor
the risk that the investment may suffer a loss before achieving
any profit and, moreover, forces the investor to forgo other valu-
See Cox, Casebook at 41 (cited in note 54) (citing Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission xviii, 40-42 (1977)). See
also Brad M. Barber, Paul A. Griffen, and Baruch Lev, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
and the Indicators of Common Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J Corp L 285, 303 (1994) (reporting
that firms on NASDAQ for the 1984-1990 period had on average 0.68 analysts following
the firm and 15.21 institutional investor owners).
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able investments due to capital constraints.59 Finally, analysts
tend to herd with other analysts in their research and invest-
ment choices. Analysts may herd to the extent that doing better
than the average analyst is not rewarded as much as doing worse
is punished.' ° The desire to herd, in turn, leads analysts to avoid
poorly followed issuers where the possibility of herding with
other analysts is low.
2. Reputational constraints.
Managers may find themselves constrained by reputational
concerns. For example, some managers gain from developing a
reputation for honesty and therefore refuse to condone fraudu-
lent disclosures to preserve this reputation. The gain from an
honest reputation may translate into monetary, social, or psy-
chological returns. Other companies may pay more to managers
with a greater reputation for honesty to signal the quality of the
company's enterprise or upcoming offerings.61 Realizing this,
managers may resist fraudulent disclosures to increase their
chance at obtaining one of these high-paying jobs.62 Managers
may also gain from the greater social standing accompanying an
Sophisticated investment arbitrageurs may face a credit constraint to the extent
outside lenders are unsure of a particular arbitrageur's abilities; outside lenders may
therefore give the arbitrageur only a limited amount of capital at an unfavorable rate un-
til they become more sure of the arbitrageur's abilities. As a result of this credit con-
straint, arbitrageurs face an opportunity cost in having money tied up in a long-term in-
vestment: the arbitrageur may lack the ability to take advantage of valuable interim op-
portunities due to the lack of funds. Arbitrageurs, therefore, may try to convince outside
investors of their financial prowess quickly to raise more funds through good performance
in relatively short-term investments. See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Equilib-
rium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 Am Econ Rev 148, 149-50 (Papers and
Proceedings, May 1990).
' This may occur where others are trying to judge an analyst's investment ability
that is not generally known to the market. To the extent "smart" investors act in a cor-
related manner--e.g., they all realize a particular stock is in fact a bad investment and
refuse to invest-then acting differently from the group may signal to the market that a
particular analyst in fact is not "smart". Therefore even analysts with some special in-
sight into the value of a security may ignore this insight and simply go along with the
group to the extent doing better than the group results in a greater investment return
while doing worse may result in being branded a bad analyst, resulting in a loss of in-
vestment funds and possibly employment. See David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein,
Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Am Econ Rev 465, 465 (1990).
"1 See Lynnette Khalfani, As Employers Focus on Ethics Training, Cottage Industry
for Consultants Grows, Wall St J B4 (Aug 12, 1996) (detailing how several companies are
turning to ethics consultants to boost their internal ethics programs); Randy N. Myers, At
Martin Marietta, This Board Game Is Lesson in Ethics, Wall St J A52 (Sept 25, 1992)
(detailing Martin Marietta's push to raise ethics awareness among its employees).
' See also Arlen and Carney, 1992 U Il1 L Rev at 702 (cited in note 55) (arguing that
the threat of termination of employment normally provides managers with strong incen-
tives not to commit fraud).
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upstanding, honest reputation. 3 Involvement with a misleading
disclosure may thus not only taint a manager's business pros-
pects but also her standing with friends and social organizations.
Finally, managers may prefer to act ethically and treat ethical
behavior as a worthwhile goal.
Importantly, the incentive for managers to engage in reputa-
tion building is greatest where the manager is under the greatest
public scrutiny. More public scrutiny results in a higher correla-
tion between the manager's actions and her public reputation.
Companies with greater public following or visibility conse-
quently will enjoy the highest level of managerial reputation in-
centives to remain truthful and complete in their disclosures.
Even where no legal action is ever brought against a company
making misleading disclosures, managers associated with a
highly visible disclosure may experience a decrease in their labor
market reputations. Applying this insight to the current Securi-
ties Act disclosure regime, S-3 company managers gain the most
from maintaining truthful company disclosures. Accordingly, the
incremental gain in fraud deterrence from increased antifraud
legal liability is diminished in the case of S-3 companies.
3. Gatekeeper constraints.
Third parties associated with an offering may act to signal
the quality and value of a company and its disclosures to inves-
tors. Academics deem a third party acting in this manner as a
"gatekeeper" or "certifier."" Certifiers reduce the asymmetric in-
formation problem between investors and issuers. Through asso-
ciation with a certifier, higher value firms are able to signal
credibly their value to investors. Investors view such a signal as
credible so long as (a) the certifiers actually possess the neces-
sary screening expertise to distinguish among different value is-
suers and (b) the certifiers have adequate incentives to execute
faithfully their certification duties. Due diligence requirements
in Section 11, for instance, provide one incentive for certifiers to
perform their gatekeeping function.65
' But see Dawn Blalock, For Many Executives, Ethics Appear to Be a Write-Off, Wall
St J C1 (Mar 26, 1996) (citing evidence that a large number of business professionals
would commit securities fraud under certain circumstances).
See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 Yale L J 857, 888-96 (1984). See also Stephen J. Choi, Certification In-
termediaries: Market Lessons for Gatekeepers (on file with U Chi L Rev) (arguing that in
many cases, legal liability is unnecessary and detrimental to the role of third-party in-
termediaries to signal quality to investors or consumers).
Due diligence sets both a certain type and quantity of screening that must occur be-
fore third parties are free from Section 11 liability. See Escott v BarChris Construction
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Other factors may also drive third-party intermediaries.' In
particular, market-based mechanisms induce some third parties
to act as certifiers.17 Imagine three sets of parties-issuers, in-
vestors, and certifiers-in a world without antifraud liability. All
other things being equal, issuers desire to sell securities to inves-
tors at the highest price possible. Some issuers, therefore, may
engage in fraud to raise their issue price. Rational investors,
however, realize this incentive and will discount the securities of
all issuers accordingly. Issuers that somehow credibly signal
their true value to investors will obtain a lower discount for their
shares and thereby raise greater offering proceeds. Association
with a third party acting as a gatekeeper against fraud provides
issuers at least one avenue to signal their value credibly.' Gate-
keepers that screen accurately for fraud and do so faithfully,
therefore, are more valuable to issuers and may demand a
greater compensation.
Indeed, left only to market-based incentives, a range of dif-
ferent quality reputational intermediaries may arise. Suppose a
particular underwriter, for example, has a reputation for rela-
tively high-quality screening for fraud. Both high-quality and
relatively lower-quality issuers may seek to retain the services of
the high-quality underwriter. In fact, to the extent investors are
otherwise unable to distinguish between the high- and low-
quality issuers, both types of issuers gain the same amount from
associating with the high-quality underwriter: associated issuers
are considered high-quality while non-associated issuers are con-
sidered lower-quality. The high-quality underwriter, however, is
not indifferent between selecting either type of firm. To the ex-
Corp, 283 F Supp 643, 682-97 (S D NY 1968); Rule 176, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.176
(1996).
The Advisory Committee as a whole and Coffee in particular recognize the gate-
keeping role that underwriters and other third parties play. See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L
Rev at 1169 (cited in note 11). They ignore, however, the market-based incentive for un-
derwriters to perform this function.
Coffee, among others, has argued that shelf registration has hurt the ability of un-
derwriters and auditors to conduct their due diligence investigations. See id at 1170
("Perhaps irretrievably, underwriters have lost their role as reputational intermediaries
in shelf registrations."). This view, however, ignores the market incentives of issuers and
underwriters to find a way for underwriters to perform a certification function to the ex-
tent investors value certification. The drop in due diligence investigations, therefore, may
reflect more the low value that investors place on the legal level of due diligence and less
the failing of the certification mechanism.
' Other means of providing investors with a credible signal of value are possible. For
example, companies making repeated trips to the capital markets for financing may de-
velop a reputation for honest dealing with investors. This reputation, in turn, is credible
to the extent investors realize that companies have an incentive to maintain their reputa-
tion in order to keep the door open for further capital market financing.
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tent the high-quality underwriter selects mainly low-quality
firms, investors eventually will reduce the reputation of the un-
derwriter, depreciating the value to issuers of associating with
the underwriter in the first place. As a result, issuers will no
longer seek to employ the services of the underwriter (or will do
so only at a lower fee). High-quality underwriters, therefore, will
seek to service only the highest-quality firms. Likewise, the next
highest-quality of underwriters will associate with the next-
highest-quality firms.
In this manner, a sorting will take place whereby the differ-
ent range of underwriter quality will in turn signal a different
range of quality issuers to the market. Through a diverse pool of
certifiers, therefore, investors may obtain information on the
relative quality and risk involved in a wide variety of different
firms in the market based on how these firms sort themselves
out among the different certifiers. Not only are investors better
protected as a result, but companies engaging in fraud are more
likely to receive a lower return for their efforts, reducing the ex
ante incentive of such companies to engage in fraud.
The market, however, may not always work in this separat-
ing fashion. In particular, there is always the risk that a third-
party intermediary may collude with the issuer and "certify" an
issue known to be fraudulent. In fact, the higher the reputation
of the intermediary, the more both the issuer and the certifier
have to gain from false certification. Legal liability may therefore
act as a means to bond third-party intermediaries to remain
faithful in the screening. However, market-based bonding
mechanisms also exist. In particular, high-quality certifiers often
are repeat players with large investments in their screening ca-
pabilities; for such intermediaries, the loss of this investment
and reputation far outweighs the gain from assisting any one is-
suer in committing fraud. Underwriters, for example, may invest
in operations around the world and hire more personnel to staff
these operations.69 Greater capacity increases the cost to certifi-
ers from a loss in credibility with investors, thereby deterring
certifiers from cooperating with issuers to mislead investors in
any one offering. Nevertheless, legal liability may have some
room to help smaller, lower-quality certifiers bond themselves to
remaining faithful. Note, however, that this argument falls far
short of a general third-party legal liability regime. In fact, im-
"See Fred R. Bleakley, U.S. Firms Shift More Office Jobs Abroad: But Most are
Filled with Local Hires, Not Americans, Wall St J A2 (Apr 22, 1996) (describing the over-
seas expansion of white-collar jobs for many companies, including Goldman Sachs).
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posing the same level of legal liability on all certifiers may do
more harm than good, particularly where it raises costs unneces-
sarily and levels the range of different quality certifiers that in-
vestors depend on to determine the quality of the issue for pric-
ing purposes.70 Where all certifiers screen with the same level of
legally imposed accuracy, investors lose the signaling informa-
tion certification provides on the relative quality of different is-
suers.
Some adjustment in the level of third-party liability based on
the quality of the third-party intermediary, therefore, may im-
prove their gatekeeper function. Moreover, the quality of third-
party certification will tend to vary systematically with the mar-
ket capitalization and following of the issuing companies. In-
vestment in certification screening quality requires large capital
and ongoing expenditures. As a result, only a few securities pro-
fessionals may undertake this expense, leading to a relatively
small pool of high-quality certifiers.7 1 In addition, to recoup these
expenses, these professionals may charge relatively high fees for
their services. Among even high-quality issuers, for example,
only those companies with enough market capitalization on
which to spread the higher fees the high-quality certifiers charge
will associate with the high-quality certifiers. Moreover, the cost
of certification may be cheaper for well followed issuers with a
relatively long operating history to the extent the certifier has
some track record with which to assess the companies' present
status. Smaller companies therefore may simply be unable to af-
ford the cost of a certifier that performs a stringent level of re-
view; alternatively, certifiers may have less incentive to expend
resources in screening these companies. As a result, smaller
companies may be forced to employ lesser-known certifiers that
may have less to lose from gambling with their reputation, and
as a result may voluntarily choose to ignore signs of fraud. Some
level of third-party liability, therefore, may be necessary to bond
certifiers that service smaller companies or companies conduct-
ing smaller offerings to remain faithful to their screening and
signaling functions.7'
' For a discussion of the defects in the market-based certification mechanism and the
role of legal intervention to bolster the certification market, see Choi, Certification Inter-
mediaries at 39-60 (cited in note 64).
71 See Richard Carter and Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter
Reputation, 45 J Fin 1045, 1054-56 (1990) (constructing a ranking of underwriter quality
based on their relative positions in tombstone advertisements for offerings from January
1979 to December 1983).
' See, for example, Rule 176, 17 CFR § 230.176 (1996) (providing that some specified
factors are "relevant circumstances" in determining whether a party has satisfied its due
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C. A Status-Based Antifraud Proposal
Has the time come for a shift toward a status-based anti-
fraud liability regime? The alternative market-based antifraud
mechanisms vary in strength largely based on the market capi-
talization and public following of the issuing company. Tailoring
antifraud legal liability to apply most strongly where other anti-
fraud mechanisms are weakest would result in the highest value
application of judicial resources. Tailoring would reduce the cost
of maintaining the antifraud liability system-including judicial
administrative costs, litigation costs, and the costs of frivolous
litigation-without a correspondingly large drop in antifraud de-
terrence due to the strong presence of alternative antifraud de-
vices. Several additional reasons also argue for a status-based
antifraud system.
First, even with the same formal level of antifraud liability,
private enforcement is more vigorous for S-3 companies. Simple
economics drives this observation. The incentives of plaintiffs at-
torneys largely propel securities class actions. A meritorious
fraud action, for example, will not be brought where plaintiffs
attorneys are not assured an adequate return on their litigation
expenses. Even after the Litigation Reform Act, private enforce-
ment still depends on the aggregating role of plaintiffs attorneys,
who amass the interests of disparate shareholders with little in-
dividual incentive to pursue litigation. Plaintiff's attorneys will
agree to manage class actions only to the extent they recover
their expenses and turn a profit. Furthermore, the costs of litiga-
tion tend to be relatively independent of the actual size of the of-
fering amount in question. 3 To prove a successful case for issue
sizes of $1 million to $100 million, plaintiffs attorneys must con-
duct depositions, go through discovery, obtain class certification,
and undertake other procedural aspects of litigation. Even merit-
based plaintiff's attorneys thus have a greater economic incentive
to pursue larger claim cases. Antifraud liability should adjust for
these incentives, increasing the return for merit-based attorneys
pursuing smaller companies for fraud, as would occur in a status-
based antifraud system.
diligence defense under Section 11(c) of the Securities Act). But see Coffee, 52 Wash &
Lee L Rev at 1160 n 46; 1175 n 90 (cited in note 11) (noting that Rule 176 has not been
interpreted by any court and that the bar largely considers Rule 176 ineffective).
, See, for example, Bohn and Choi, 144 U Pa L Rev at 936-37 (cited in note 35)
(providing evidence that smaller offerings less frequently face private securities fraud
litigation, and attributing this phenomenon to the plaintiff's attorneys' fixed costs of liti-
gation).
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Second, where plaintiffs attorneys pursue frivolous litiga-
tion, the incentives of such attorneys result in a disproportion-
ately larger cost for those companies conducting larger offerings.
Frivolous-suit plaintiffs attorneys will target companies with
relatively large amounts of cash as a means of boosting the
amount of money they may possibly obtain from settlement. To
the extent that larger, more highly capitalized companies possess
a greater amount of liquid resources to satisfy a judgment or set-
tlement, tend to conduct larger offerings, or else own greater
amounts of securities litigation liability insurance, these compa-
nies more frequently will become the target of frivolous suits.7'
Reducing antifraud liability for larger companies may result in
greater numbers of such companies seeking to raise capital
through securities offerings rather than more traditional bank
financing. Where market-based antifraud mechanisms work ef-
fectively to deter fraud even in the absence of legal liability, the
number of quality issues from large companies will increase.
Paradoxically, reducing antifraud liability raises the average
quality level of issues presented to investors.
From the standpoint of fraud deterrence, therefore, varying
the level of antifraud liability based on the status of the company
may present a more efficient use of judicial resources and im-
prove the quality of capital market offerings. Furthermore, a
status-based antifraud regime may be accomplished through a
simple reform to the existing Securities Act regime. This Article,
for example, proposes that reform track the same differentiation
that currently exists within the Securities Act: S-3 companies
would be presumed to face the greatest array of alternative de-
terrents against fraud and would accordingly receive the lowest
level of antifraud liability. Similarly, S-2 and S-1 companies
would receive a reduced presumption of market following and in-
creasingly greater levels of antifraud liability.
Antifraud liability, of course, incorporates several different
elements. For each of the major antifraud provisions in the secu-
rities laws, courts must deal with different materiality, reliance,
causation, and scienter requirements. Section 11, for example,
requires no showing of reliance, causation, or scienter but does
require a material misstatement or omission for liability to at-
tach."5 Similarly, Section 12(a)(2) liability applies only to mate-
rial misstatements and omissions; in contrast to Section 11, how-
" Id. Note, however, that to the extent that smaller issuers possess securities liability
insurance, frivolous plaintiffs attorneys may also target the smaller issuers.
See Section 11(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(a).
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ever, Section 12(a)(2) requires some amount of causation.' Fur-
thermore, Section 12(a)(2) provides a negligence standard of sorts
in the form of a defense against liability: the defendant has the
burden of proof to show that "he did not know, and in the exer-
cise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission" to escape liability.77 Finally, Rule 10b-5 similarly con-
tains a material misstatement or omission requirement. Reli-
ance and causation are required, but plaintiffs may use the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory to demonstrate reliance. 9 In con-
trast to both Sections 11 and 12(a)(2), however, Rule 10b-5 im-
poses a scienter requirement.'
The major antifraud provisions also differ in their specifica-
tion of who may bring suit as private plaintiffs and who may be
sued as potential defendants. Section 11 provides liability only
for those who purchased securities sold pursuant to a registra-
tion statement;8 Section 11 also lists a closed set of possible de-
fendants including the issuer, directors of the issuer, profession-
als who certified a portion of the registration statement, and all
underwriters involved in the offering. 2 Under Section 11(b), fur-
thermore, all defendants except the issuer enjoy a due diligence
defense.' Section 12(a)(2) provides liability generally for pur-
chasers of securities; in contrast to Section 11, however, purchas-
ers may bring suit under Section 12(a)(2) only against those with
whom they enjoy privity or those who engaged in a solicitation of
7' See Section 12(aX2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(2); Sanders v John
Nuveen & Co, 619 F2d 1222, 1225 (7th Cir 1980) (stating that § 12(aX2) "requires some
causal connection between the misleading representation or omission and plaintiffs pur-
chase").
Section 12(a)(2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(2).
See Rule 10b-5, Exchange Act, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1996); Basic Inc v Levinson, 485
US 223, 230-32 (1988).
" See Basic, 485 US at 247 ("Because most publicly available information is reflected
in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, there-
fore, maybe presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.").
' See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 201-14 (1976) (language and history of
Section 10(b) support scienter requirement); Gray v First Winthrop Corp, 82 F3d 877, 884
(9th Cir 1996) ("In order to meet the scienter requirement [of Rule 10b-5], plaintiffs must
show either knowing or reckless conduct on the part of defendants.").
" See Section 11(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(a).
, See Section 11(aXl)-(5), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(aXl)-(5). See also
Section 6, Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77f (requiring that the issuer and its prin-
cipal executive officer, financial officer, and the majority of the board of directors sign the
registration statement).
I See Section 11(b), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(b). The nature of the due
diligence defense depends on the relationship between the defendant and the issuer.
Escott v BarChris Construction Corp, 283 F Supp 643, 682-97 (S D NY 1968); Rule 176,
Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.176 (1996).
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an offer to buy." Lastly, Rule 10b-5 provides a private remedy for
all purchasers and sellers against any party that perpetrates a
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."'
Because the Supreme Court abolished aiding and abetting liabil-
ity under Rule 10b-5, 6 however, third parties face an uncertain
scope of liability.1
7
Finally, antifraud provisions may differ in the amount of
damages available as well as possible defenses against liability.8
Section 11, Section 12(a)(2), and Rule 10b-5, however, each pro-
vide defendants the ability to prove that the plaintiffs' loss-
usually measured in terms of a drop in the secondary market
price-was caused by factors other than the defendants'
misleading misstatement or omission.89
A status-based antifraud regime must correlate the variation
among these elements with (1) the availability of alternative an-
tifraud mechanisms, and (2) the company's size and trading
status. In particular, the demands of materiality, scienter, and
third-party defendants and their defenses should vary with the
company's status when determining liability in such a regime.
1. Materiality.
Materiality serves as a common element for all the antifraud
provisions, determining the scope of disclosure subject to anti-
fraud liability. The materiality requirement demands an untrue
statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact
See Section 12(aX2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(aX2); Sanders, 619
F2d at 1226 ("[T]he statute explicitly requires privity between plaintiff-purchaser and de-
fendant-seller.").
' Rule 10b-5, Exchange Act, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1996). Courts have found activities
by defendants to be "in connection7 with the purchase or sale by the plaintiff of a security
in cases where the defendant merely disseminated false or misleading statements into
the market through a press release or other means reasonably calculated to affect inves-
tors trading the security on the open market. See SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, 401 F2d
833, 858-61 (2d Cir 1968).
' See Central Bank of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 US 164, 191
(1994) (holding that plaintiffs may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
Third parties may still face Rule 10b-5 liability as "indirect" primary violators.
Prior to 1991, the antifraud provisions also differed in the statute of limitations to
file a claim. In 1991, however, the Supreme Court extended the same statute of limita-
tions contained in Section 13 of the Securities Act to Rule 10b-5 actions. See Lampf
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petrigrow v Gilbertson, 501 US 350, 359 (1991).
"See Section 11(e), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(e); Section 12(aX2), Se-
curities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(aX2); Jon Koslow, Note, Estimating Aggregate
Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59
Fordham L Rev 811, 817 & n 27 (1991) (i[Tihe connected elements of materiality, reliance
and causation require that damages calculations under Rule 10b-5 exclude the effects of
market fluctuations unrelated to the fraud or misrepresentation.").
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necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." Even
for information that otherwise would be considered material,
however, the securities laws provide at least two different safe
harbors under Rule 175 of the Securities Act9 and the new Sec-
tion 27A of the Securities Act, enacted as part of the Litigation
Reform Act.9 2 Although similar in approach, the safe harbors un-
der Rule 175 and Section 27A are not identical. Section 27A ap-
plies generally to all forward-looking statements regardless of
whether the statement is oral or contained in a written docu-
ment;93 Rule 175 applies only to forward-looking statements
present in a specified Exchange Act filing or in a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act.94 Furthermore, Rule 175
requires that the issuer both have a reasonable basis and act in
good faith. 5 Section 27A, on the other hand, provides a safe har-
bor for an issuer that either makes meaningful cautionary state-
ments or succeeds in defending against the charge that it had ac-
tual knowledge of the misleading statement or omission.96 Fi-
nally, although wider in scope, the safe harbor in Section 27A
' Although termed "materiality" in this Article, this element actually consists of two
parts: there must be present a (1) material misstatement or omission of a (2) fact. See
Virginia Bankshares, Inc v Sandberg, 501 US 1083, 1090-98 (1991) (holding that even if
statements were material, they must still consist of "facts" to fall within the scope of Rule
14a-9 proxy solicitation antifraud liability). For the purposes of this Article, however, all
that is important is that the material fact requirement together with the forward-looking
statement safe harbors determine the scope of statements within the reach of antifraud
liability.
' 17 CFR § 230.175 (1996). Rule 3b-6 of the Exchange Act provides a parallel provi-
sion for the Exchange Act. See 17 CFR § 240.3b-6 (1996).
"Section 27A, Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-2. Section 21E of the Ex-
change Act provides a parallel provision for the Exchange Act. See Section 21E, Exchange
Act, codified at 15 USCA § 78u-5. In addition to Rule 175 and Section 27A, courts have
also constructed a carve-out from materiality under the bespeaks caution doctrine. See
Jonathan B. Lurvey, Note, Who is Bespeaking to Whom? Plaintiff Sophistication, Market
Information, and Forward-Looking Statements, 45 Duke L J 579, 587 & n 46 (1995).
Section 27A(i)(1) provides a definition of "forward-looking statement" that includes
statements containing financial projections, the plans and objectives of management, and
the managements discussion and analysis of the company's financial condition or results
of operations. See Section 27A(iXl), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-2(aXiXl).
Section 27A does make several exclusions based on past bad acts, specific transactions-
including going private transactions, tender offers, and initial public offerings, among
other exclusions. See Section 27A(b), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-2(b).
See Rule 175(bX1), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.175(bXl) (1996).
See Rule 175(a), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.175(a) (1996).
See Section 27A(cXl), Securities Act. The meaningful cautionary statements must
accompany the forward-looking statement. Furthermore, the forward-looking statement
must be specifically identified as such. See Section 27A(cX1XA), Securities Act, codified at
15 USCA § 77z-2(cX1XA). Furthermore, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof of demon-
strating that the defendant (or an executive officer where the issuer is the defendant) had
actual knowledge. See Section 27A(cX1XB), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-
2(cXl)(B).
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applies only to Exchange Act reporting companies and their
agents;" even initial public offering issuers, conversely, may take
advantage of Rule 175 to protect forward-looking statements
made in the registration statement.9 8 The current forward-
looking information safe harbors, therefore, do take a somewhat
status-based approach, recognizing at least partially that the
danger of fraudulent forward-looking statements misleading in-
vestors varies with the company involved.
This Article contends that lawmakers should more explicitly
take into account differences among companies in constructing
information safe harbors. As an initial matter, lawmakers may
wish to focus on three facets of the information safe harbors: (a)
the medium of the forward-looking statement-whether oral or
written, and if written, what type of document; (b) the informa-
tion investors are required to receive or possess in addition to the
forward-looking statement; and (c) the state of mind required of
the issuers. For companies that trade in an efficient market with
a large analyst following, the danger of misleading forward-
looking statements is at a minimum while the risk of frivolous
litigation is large. Institutional investors of larger, well followed
issuers, for example, have both a larger amount of information
and greater resources to analyze a company's forward-looking
disclosures.99 Moreover, less sophisticated investors of large issu-
ers are protected through the secondary market price mechanism
in an efficient market. Associated certification intermediaries
will also be more willing to put their reputation for screening
against fraud on the line and invest resources into assessing the
issuer. For such companies, a safe harbor should exist for for-
ward-looking information disclosures without restriction on the
means of transmission-oral or written-because investors will
assess the forward-looking statement equally well regardless of
the medium. Furthermore, because information exists in the
market to protect investors through an efficient price mecha-
See Section 27A(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-2(a). In addition to
the issuer, persons acting on behalf of the issuer, outside reviewers retained by the is-
suer, and underwriters may make use of Section 27A. See id. Moreover, forward-looking
statements made in connection with an initial public offering are expressly excluded from
the safe harbor. See Section 27A(bX2)(D), Securities Act, codified at 15 USCA § 77z-
2(bX2)(D).
See Rule 175(bXlXii), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.175(bXlXi) (1996). In addition,
persons acting on behalf of the issuer and an outside reviewer retained by the issuer may
make use of the safe harbor. See Rule 175(a), 17 CFR § 230.175(a) (1996).
See Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co, 892 F2d 509, 517 (7th Cir 1989) ("Issuers
of securities must reveal firm-specific information. Investors combine this with public in-
formation to derive estimates about the securities' value. It is pointless and costly to
compel firms to reprint information already in the public domain.").
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nism, so long as the market as a whole has enough information
to correctly assess the disclosure, no further information should
be required of the issuer. Issuers, in other words, should face a
duty only to disclose firm-specific information that is necessary
for the market to interpret intelligibly the forward-looking
statements and that the market does not already possess.0 0 Al-
though meaningful cautionary statements made together with a
forward-looking statement may satisfy this requirement, where
the information already exists in the market, cautionary state-
ments should not be required of well followed companies. Finally,
because of the fear of frivolous suits, larger, well followed com-
panies should be allowed to use a forward-looking statement safe
harbor even where the market lacks adequate information on the
projections so long as the plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual
knowledge on the issuer's part.
Conversely, the risk of misleading information for smaller,
lightly followed companies is greater while the danger of frivo-
lous suits is reduced. For such companies, therefore, it may first
make sense to restrict the forward-looking statement safe harbor
to documents that the SEC may have some chance to review. For
example, Rule 175 restricts its safe harbor protections to only
certain Exchange Act filings and the registration statement un-
der the Securities Act.' Second, because the market most likely
is not efficient for small, less well followed companies, simply
relying on publicly available information to provide investors a
sufficient basis with which to interpret the issuer's projections
may prove inadequate. Therefore, smaller companies should face
a requirement that meaningful cautionary language specifically
tailored to provide investors enough basis to decipher the projec-
tions intelligibly be delivered with the forward-looking state-
ments. Third, because the danger of frivolous suit is less, issuers
seeking to make use of a forward-looking information safe harbor
should also--in addition to the meaningful cautionary language
requirement-be required to demonstrate that they acted in good
faith.
To put these insights into the current Form S-1, S-2, S-3
framework, this Article proposes the following forward-looking
information safe harbor regime. S-3 companies-possessing the
greatest presumption of market efficiency and alternative anti-
"TIn other words, there must exist a reasonable basis in the market to interpret the
projection. See id at 516 (holding that for purposes of Rule 175 a reasonable basis exists
so long as no firm-specific information necessary to interpret the forward-looking state-
ments is absent from the market).
"'See Rule 175(bXl), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.175(bXl) (1996).
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fraud mechanisms-should be allowed to make forward-looking
disclosures freely as under Section 27A with one significant
change: rather than being required to deliver meaningful cau-
tionary language with the forward-looking statement, issuers
should be allowed to demonstrate either that they supplied such
cautionary language or else that the market already possessed
enough information to assess the projections (the "broad scope"
safe harbor). °2 At the other extreme, S-1 companies should be re-
stricted to the current regime's Rule 175 safe harbor with one dif-
ference: rather than a reasonable basis, S-1 companies should be
required to demonstrate that they delivered meaningful caution-
ary language directly to investors (the "restricted scope" safe
harbor). Finally, an S-2 company should be allowed to use a for-
ward-looking information safe harbor for (a) forward-looking
statements in all forms of oral and written communications; (b)
so long as the company provided meaningful cautionary language
or the market had enough information to form a reasonable ba-
sis; and (c) the S-2 company also acted in good faith (the
"intermediate scope" safe harbor).
2. Scienter.
Scienter represents one of the greatest barriers to securities
fraud actions. Where no scienter is required, as under Section 11,
plaintiffs have a relatively easy time proving other aspects of the
cause of action that depend on more objective elements. The
chances of success at trial diminish with Section 12(a)(2), which
may require plaintiffs to rebut the defense that the defendants
did not have knowledge or with reasonable care could not have
obtained knowledge of the misstatement or omission. Finally,
plaintiffs face the greatest hurdle proving actual intent or reck-
lessness under Rule 10b-5.
Although the differences in the antifraud liability system's
use of scienter now vary by transaction, the availability of the al-
ternative antifraud mechanisms, as well as the risk of frivolous
litigation, counsel for varying the scienter requirement based on
the company's status. For example, one possible system would
assign S-3 companies antifraud liability based on actual intent or
recklessness regardless of the transaction in which they engaged.
S-2 companies would face liability to the extent they acted with-
out reasonable care in their disclosures. Finally, strict liability
would apply to S-I companies. Such a system would provide the
'"See Wielgos, 892 F2d at 516.
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greatest amount of legal antifraud liability where market-based
mechanisms are at their weakest: for S-i companies.0 3
3. Third-party liability.
The final antifraud element that should vary based on com-
pany status is the extent of liability on third parties associated
with the company.' For all types of issuers, third parties play a
crucial role in signaling the value and quality of the offering to
the public. The market, moreover, provides third parties acting
as gatekeepers with an incentive to maintain their vigilance.
Underwriters, for instance, are paid by issuers based on their
ability to attract investors; underwriters, in turn, attract inves-
tors through the underwriters' reputation for screening low-
quality issues. Legal liability on third parties acts as a secondary
incentive mechanism to ensure that third parties truly act as
gatekeepers. As with legal liability on issuers, however, legal li-
ability on third parties is not cost-free. Gatekeepers may respond
to legal liability through excessive screening expenditures or, al-
ternatively, third parties may simply refuse to participate in the
offering transaction. This cost increases with the greater prob-
ability of frivolous litigation, as in the case of the larger compa-
nies. Moreover, as discussed above, the market-based incentive of
third parties to act as gatekeepers is strongest for larger, more
capitalized companies and companies with larger offerings." 5
'"Moreover, for companies with relatively less leeway to engage in fraud-for exam-
ple where a number of analysts follow the company, managers face reputational pres-
sures to remain truthful, and certifiers possess strong market-based incentives to screen
for fraud-requiring a greater showing of scienter provides two direct benefits. First, the
possibility of frivolous suits is reduced to the extent scienter becomes another issue on
which securities defendants may rid themselves of a suit under summary judgment. Sec-
ond, with a greater scienter requirement, antifraud liability acts to discipline only the
most egregious fraudulent statements or omissions, leaving the market to deter less open
instances of fraud. See text accompanying notes 66-68 for a discussion of the market-
based incentive for third-party intermediaries to screen for fraud.
" The present Section 11 and Section 12(aX2) liability provisions provide different
scopes of third-party liability. Section 11 imposes liability on officers and directors of the
issuer, underwriters, and experts including auditors. See Section 11(a), Securities Act,
codified at 15 USC § 77(k)(a). Section 12(a)(2), conversely, imposes liability on those third
parties that acted to solicit an offer to buy from the investor. Therefore, brokers that
would not be considered underwriters under Section 2(11) and, as a result, not within
Section 11 liability may still face Section 12(aX2) liability. Similarly, auditors that are
targeted specifically for Section 11 liability may escape Section 12(a)(2) liability to the ex-
tent they never deal directly with the investors. See Section 12(aX2), Securities Act, codi-
fied at 15 USCA § 771(aX2). A detailed examination of the optimal range of third-party li-
ability is outside the scope of this Article. Rather, at a minimum, the Article assumes
that third-party liability, where it is justified at all, should fall on major participants in
an offering-including the underwriters, auditors, and officers and directors of the issuer.
" See text accompanying notes 69-72.
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As a starting point, this Article proposes the following third-
party liability scheme. First, the scope of third-party liability
should fall only on a clearly defined set of third parties that op-
erate under a market relationship with the issuer. Section 11
provides such a well defined list of possible third-party defen-
dants, imposing liability on underwriters, experts with respect to
expertised portions of the registration statement, and directors
and key officers of the issuer. Neither Section 12(a)(2) nor Rule
10b-5, however, currently provides a similarly well-defined scope
of third-party liability."° Ex ante clarity is important to provide
those third parties who are able to screen for fraud the incentive
to do so and relieve other third parties from the fear of liability.
Moreover, under all three liability provisions, those third parties
with the ability to screen for fraud and signal this information to
the market remain the same. The scope of third-party liability,
therefore, should also remain constant-focusing on underwrit-
ers, experts (for example, accountants with respect to informa-
tion in the financial statements), directors, and officers.
Second, the level of third-party liability should vary based on
whether the issuer is an S-I, S-2, or S-3 company. To achieve the
full benefits of a market-based certification, third-party interme-
diaries associated with S-3 companies should face no legal liabil-
ity. Likewise, because of the danger that certifiers associated
with S-1 companies may have fewer market-based incentives to
screen faithfully for fraud-and the certification market may
collapse as a result for such companies-third-party liability
should be placed on certifiers, with a due diligence defense for
third parties that perform a reasonable investigation and have a
reasonable and actual belief in the accuracy of the issuer's disclo-
sures. Through the due diligence defense, third parties are given
an incentive to maintain a standard of screening at least as great
as required by due diligence. Finally, third parties associated
with S-2 companies should face the same standard of investiga-
tion and care required of third parties associated with S-1 com-
panies; however, to account for the greater danger of frivolous
suits, the burden should be on plaintiffs to prove that third par-
ties failed to meet this standard of investigation and care and
acted negligently.
Table 1 summarizes the proposed status-based level of anti-
fraud liability that different companies should face regardless of
the type of primary transaction in which they engage. The re-
mainder of this Article refers to the three levels of liability as
" See text accompanying notes 84-87.
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Level I for S-1 companies, Level II for S-2 companies, and Level
IH for S-3 companies.
Table 1: Elements of Status-Based Antifraud Liability
Level I Level 11 Level M
(Form S-i) (Form S-2) (Form S-3)
Scienter • Strict Liability * Negligence - Scienter
Standard of
Care
Third-Party * Experts, * Experts, * None (issuer
Liability Underwriters, Underwriters, only is liable)
Officers & Officers &
Directors Directors
- Reasonable
Investigation,
Reasonable
Belief Defense
Forward- * Good Faith and Good Faith and * Good Faith or
Looking Accompanying Reasonable Reasonable
Statements Meaningful Basis within Basis within
(Scope of Cautionary the Market the Market
Materiality) Language
- SEC Filing - Any Document - Any Document
Documents or Oral or Oral
only Disclosure Disclosure
D. Refining Status-Based Antifraud Liability
Several possible arguments exist against a shift toward
status-based antifraud liability. First, some commentators may
view a status-based antifraud system as unfairly penalizing S-1
companies. The proposed status-based approach seems in conflict
with the trend within both the SEC and Congress to facilitate
raising capital for smaller-sized firms. Both the SEC and Con-
gress, in fact, have repeatedly adopted initiatives to reduce the
cost of issuing securities for small companies. Small businesses,
for example, may use either Regulation A or Rule 504 of Regula-
tion D to issue moderate amounts of nonrestricted securities into
the general marketplace without undergoing Section 5's public
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offering process.' Such issues, furthermore, are immune from
Section 11 or 12(a)(2) liability and face only Rule 10b-5's level of
antifraud deterrence. Although investors may have relatively
less public information on these small issuers, the desire to re-
duce the cost of raising capital for small businesses may justify
such exemptions. Placing a more stringent level of antifraud li-
ability on these small issuers, therefore, runs counter to the goal
of increasing the access small businesses have to the capital
markets.
On the other hand, the danger of frivolous or even merit-
based litigation for small issuers is not great.0 8 Therefore, im-
posing a higher level of antifraud liability may not impose too
large a cost on issuers to the extent most small issuers will never
experience an antifraud suit in any case. Although antifraud i-
ability may increase, on an absolute level, even if some antifraud
suits are frivolous, the probability of such suits is small. Fur-
thermore, to the extent market-based antifraud mechanisms are
weak for small issuers, raising the level of legal antifraud liabil-
ity may have a relatively large deterrent effect. Moreover, to the
extent small companies do pose a greater risk of fraud, failing to
raise the level of antifraud liability provides such companies with
too great a benefit. If the government wishes to encourage such
companies, more direct subsidies-such as tax breaks-make
more sense from the standpoint of protecting the integrity of the
capital markets.
Second, others may claim that imposing Section 11-type li-
ability on S-1 companies for all forms of primary transactions in
which the S-1 companies engage will have negative consequences
on the disclosure of even truthful information from such compa-
nies. This argument, however, depends critically on the assump-
"See, for example, Linda C. Quinn, Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A Concep-
tual Framework, Insights 25, 27 (Jan 1996) ("From the investors' perspective, the in-
creased compensation to distributors and the compressed period of the selling effort, as
well as the issuer's interest in obtaining funds, set up a situation in which potential con-
flicts of interest between investors and sellers are enhanced.").
Quinn also argues that primary market transactions should take on more importance
because fraud within such transactions directly impacts capital allocation decisions in the
economy, whereas secondary market transactions do not. Id at 27. Secondary market dis-
closures, however, may indirectly affect primary transactions. For example, issuers often
look to the secondary market price in determining whether to conduct an offering and at
what price. Furthermore, other companies may base both their internal capital allocation
and external financing decisions on their own and other companies' secondary market
prices.
" This is true at least to the extent small companies tend to raise only small amounts
of capital. See Bohn and Choi, 144 U Pa L Rev at 936 (cited in note 35) (noting that initial
public offerings with offering amounts below $1.79 million almost never faced a securities
fraud class action in connection with the offering).
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tion that some amount of error takes place either at trial or at
settlement in a securities fraud suit. For example, to the extent
issuers are willing to settle even frivolous complaints, then issu-
ers may find truthful information disclosure costly. Without error
or frivolous suits, conversely, issuers face no antifraud liability
from engaging in truthful disclosures."9 Furthermore, frivolous
suits may occur regardless of the level of even truthful informa-
tion disclosure. Such suits, for example, may be brought based on
an alleged omission of material information; so long as a duty to
disclose is present,"0 no explicit information disclosure of any
type is required in alleging a fraud suit. Evidence exists, in fact,
that the type of information disclosure alleged fraudulent in a se-
curities class action suit has little impact on the relationship be-
tween the eventual settlement and the potential damage award
in such a suit."' Additionally, even if error is present at trial, re-
ducing the substantive level of antifraud liability may not be the
best way of addressing this problem. After all, antifraud liability
also works to deter truly fraudulent disclosures or omissions; re-
ducing liability, therefore, may increase the incidence of actual
fraud in addition to truthful information disclosures. The proce-
dural screens imposed through the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, therefore, may provide a better means of reducing
the incidence of frivolous suits, at least for less well followed
companies.
Third, some may also argue that larger, more well followed
companies may gain the most from fraudulent disclosures or
omissions and, moreover, may share this with their third-party
intermediaries as an inducement to certify fraud. Investors,
holding the belief that fraud is less likely for such companies and
their certifiers, will discount less for fraud and therefore provide
an appetizing target for fraudulent issuers. However, it seems
doubtful that investors would systematically hold incorrect be-
liefs as to the incentives of large, well followed companies and
their intermediaries. Investors that correctly anticipate the in-
centive of issuers and their intermediaries to engage in fraud on
average will discount the shares of such companies, reducing the
gain from fraud for such companies in turn. In fact, two
equilibria are possible: (a) certifiers may remain unable to bond
1
" See Arlen and Carney, 1992 U Il1 L Rev at 692 n 8 (cited in note 55).
..The Managements Discussion and Analysis section of the registration statement,
for example, provides a duty to disclose a variety of information on the current operations
and financial condition of the issuer. See Item 303, Regulation S-K, Securities Act, 17
CFR § 229.303 (1996).
.'See Bohn and Choi, 144 U Pa L Rev at 970-76 (cited in note 35).
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themselves to faithfully executing their certification role, and in-
vestors will treat the certification as worthless and discount ac-
cordingly. In this case, even well followed companies will have no
particular ability to defraud investors on average. Or (b) certifi-
ers may find some means of bonding themselves to screening for
fraud-either through legal liability or market reputation-and
therefore investors will believe that on average company disclo-
sures-at least after certification-are relatively truthful. In this
equilibrium, however, certifiers must maintain their accurate
screening and stop issuers from engaging in fraud in order to
maintain their reputations. Therefore, in the second possible
equilibrium, large, well followed issuers also possess no special
ability to defraud investors.
Finally, the incentive of companies to engage in misleading
disclosures may in fact vary based on the type of primary trans-
action involved." As a result, the need of investors for antifraud
protections may also vary across different transactions, counsel-
ing against a status-based antifraud regime.
Public offerings typically are sold to a wide range of inves-
tors, including individuals. Accordingly, public offering investors
" Although this Article does not focus on the question of antifraud liability for
secondary market transactions, arguably even for information disclosures outside the
context of a primary issuance of securities the level of liability on the company should
vary based on the status of the company. Some may argue, however, that companies en-
gaged in a public offering possess a greater incentive to mislead; overstating earnings and
other financial information, for example, may directly raise an issuer's offering proceeds.
See, for example, Quinn, Insights at 27 (cited in note 107) ("From the investors' perspec-
tive, the increased compensation to distributors and the compressed period of the selling
effort, as well as the issuer's interest in obtaining funds, set up a situation in which po-
tential conflicts of interest between investors and sellers are enhanced.'). In contrast,
companies without an ongoing public offering may have less incentive to produce mis-
leading information that may act only to affect secondary market prices. This argument
lacks force, however, because secondary market prices do matter to companies and their
managers. Managers, for example, care greatly about secondary market prices to the ex-
tent they may engage in secondary market trades for their own account or possess op-
tions in the company's stock. More importantly, the secondary market price often directly
determines the ability of companies to conduct a seasoned offering at a particular price.
See note 107 (describing the link between secondary market and offering prices). There-
fore, the distinction between information that affects the company's offering price and in-
formation that only affects the secondary market price is ambiguous at best.
Nevertheless, unlike in a primary market transaction, it is unclear at what level the
amount of damages should be set for fraud in secondary market transactions. See Donald
C. Langevoort, Symposium, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz
L Rev 639, 642-43 (1996) (arguing that damages in fraud on the market cases should be
aimed at deterring violators, rather than compensating victims); Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U Chi L Rev 611, 612-14 (1985)
(applying an economic model to determine the optimal level of damages). Therefore, al-
though the same standards of liability should apply between primary and secondary mar-
ket information disclosures, additional analysis beyond the scope of this Article is re-
quired to determine the correct damages level.
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may differ considerably in their investment expertise. Private
placements, on the other hand, are sold mostly to institutional
investors and others with either a great degree of investment so-
phistication (or access to such sophistication through their in-
vestment advisors) or insider access to the issuer."' Such inves-
tors may neither require nor value high levels of antifraud li-
ability. If this characterization is true, social welfare increases
with higher levels of antifraud liability for public offerings rela-
tive to private placements.
But private placements may also include investors without
great investment sophistication. Under Rule 504 of Regulation D,
for example, issuers may sell securities to any number of inves-
tors, regardless of their sophistication, so long as they keep the
total offering amount below $1 million." Regulation D also al-
lows issuers to sell securities under Rules 505 or 506 to as many
accredited investors as they desire."5 Although accredited inves-
tors do include institutional investors and other seemingly so-
phisticated investors, the reach of the definition is overly broad;
it includes all individual investors making more than $200,000
per year or worth over $1 million regardless of their financial ex-
pertise."' Indeed, both Rules 505 and 506 allow the sales of secu-
rities to up to thirty-five unaccredited investors."7 Whether pri-
vate placement investors systematically possess a greater degree
of sophistication over public offerings is therefore debatable. Fur-
thermore, other exempt transactions, including intrastate offer-
ings,1 8 possess a range of investors little different from a general
public offering.
Even were private placements to contain a significantly dif-
ferent pool of investors from public offerings, the argument for a
different level of antifraud liability is still suspect. For example,
although investors may be more sophisticated in a private
placement, the presence of sophisticated investors in an S-3 com-
pany's public offering will protect unsophisticated investors. Al-
though not all investors in a public offering may receive the pro-
spectus before they make their purchase decision, at least some
of the more sophisticated investors will receive this information.
'"See Section 4(1), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77d(2).
".. See Rule 504, Regulation D, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.504 (1996).
"See Rules 505 and 506, Regulation D, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.505-06 (1996).
"'See Rule 501(a), Regulation D, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (1996).
..See Rules 505 and 506, Regulation D, Securities Act, 17 CFR §§ 230.505(bX2Xii),
230.506(b)(2)(i).
"'See Section 3(a)(11), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77c(aXl) (exempting in-
trastate offerings); Rule 147, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.147 (1996) (clarifying transac-
tions covered and defining terms used in the Section 3(aX11) exemption).
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Sophisticated investors may also look to the SEC filings pursuant
to the offering to obtain information on the offering. These inves-
tors will then trade in the secondary market until all information
from the offering is incorporated into the secondary market price.
Issuers will then set their offering price based on this secondary
market price; to do otherwise would either run the risk of driving
away investors, to the extent the secondary market price is lower
than the offering price, or giving up offering proceeds, where the
secondary market price is greater than the offering price. Unso-
phisticated investors in a public offering of S-3 company securi-
ties, therefore, are protected through the secondary price mecha-
nism. For S-3 companies, the different pools of investors simply
do not matter.
Now take the case of an S-1 company contemplating both a
public and private offering. Here the opponents of the status-
based liability regime can make their best argument for some
tailoring of antifraud liability based on the type of investors in-
volved in the transactions. Unlike S-3 offerings, regulators may
not presume the existence of an efficient market mechanism to
transmit information from one type of offering to the other.
Similarly, the number of sophisticated investors may be limited.
Furthermore, no secondary market price signal may exist to
transmit the information known to sophisticated investors to
other investors.
Regulators, as a result, may wish to add a transaction-based
component to the basic status-based antifraud approach detailed
in this Article. This Article therefore proposes a possible refine-
ment to the status-based regime outlined above: Antifraud li-
ability for S-1 companies in the private placement context should
decrease modestly from Level I liability to Level JI liability. S-1
companies would still face Level I liability for public offerings.
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the importance
of the transaction-based aspect of antifraud liability. Although
some investors may be more sophisticated in private placements
for S-1 companies, even these sophisticated investors may not
make the necessary fixed cost expenditures to assess fully the
companies' true value to the extent the market capitalization and
offerings from S-1 companies tend to be smaller."9 Furthermore,
the alternative antifraud mechanisms are at their weakest for S-
'"'Of course, investors in a private placement may individually obtain a larger share
of the private placement than they would in a public offering. Even if they were to do so,
investors would still have more incentive to invest in assessing the value of a public of-
fering to the extent the resulting trading market allowed them to take advantage of any
information they learned (for example, through short sales).
1997] 603
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1 companies." ° Even within a private placement involving more
sophisticated investors, investors must take into account that the
S-1 company has a lower analyst following, a reduced managerial
reputational incentive to avoid fraud, and potentially absent or
lower-quality third-party certification intermediaries.
II. STATUS-BASED REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE
Despite the arguments for status-based antifraud liability,
most commentators have instead focused on introducing status-
based registration and disclosure requirements more formally
into the securities laws. Under the rubric of "company registra-
tion," the SEC's Advisory Committee Report represents the cul-
mination of recent academic and governmental efforts toward
implementing status-based registration and disclosure. This Part
analyzes the transaction- versus status-based approaches within
the current regime and discusses the Advisory Committee's pro-
posed reforms. The Article concludes that the reforms do little to
move current practices substantively further toward a company
registration system. Most of the proposed reforms do not deal di-
rectly with company registration, but instead involve incre-
mental adjustments in the current regime. To the extent the Ad-
visory Committee's reforms actually do make a substantive im-
pact on registration and disclosure practices, the Article argues
that a status-based antifraud regime accomplishes the same re-
sults with lower transaction and uncertainty costs.
A. The Current Regime
The current regime's dual status- and transaction-based ap-
proaches stem from the initial separation of functions between
the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Conceived as a means to
protect investors from the "sharp" practices of issuers, the Secu-
rities Act regulates individual securities market transactions."
To guard against the incentive of issuers to mislead during an of-
fering and to ensure that investors receive adequate investment
information, the Securities Act's transaction approach provides
investors and the SEC a convenient focal point for regulation.
Especially where information on particular companies is not
readily available, targeting issuer-initiated transactions allows
'"See Section I.B.
"Section 5 of the Securities Act serves as the linchpin for this transaction-based fo-
cus. Section 5(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e(a), makes unlawful any sale of a
security through the means of interstate commerce, unless the security is sold under an
effective registration statement.
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the SEC to provide information where investors most need pro-
tection. The Exchange Act, in contrast, focuses more on protect-
ing the secondary markets and ensuring their integrity.' Many
secondary market transactions do not directly involve the issuer,
but rather take place with market participants on both sides of
transactions. Waiting for an issuer-initiated transaction to trig-
ger information disclosure may leave these market participants
without adequate investment information. To provide all
secondary market investors with timely information, the Ex-
change Act takes a status-based approach, forcing issuers meet-
ing certain requirements to file periodic information updates
with the SEC, which are subsequently transmitted to the mar-
ket.' This Section (1) details the transaction focus within the
Securities Act, and (2) compares it to the Exchange Act's status-
based approach.'
1. Securities Act.
The linchpin of the Securities Act's transaction focus is the
registration process of Section 5 of the Act. Commonly referred to
as the gun-jumping rules, the registration process carefully con-
trols the flow of information to investors and proceeds through
three distinct phases. In the "pre-filing period," Section 5(c) re-
stricts all offers and sales prior to the filing of the registration
statement with the SEC. 5 After the registration statement is
'The Exchange Act includes a smorgasbord of provisions aimed at regulating ex-
changes and the National Market System, brokers and dealers, insider short-swing profit
trading, and market manipulation. See, for example, Section 9, Exchange Act, codified at
15 USC § 78i (prohibiting manipulation of security prices). This Article focuses solely on
the Exchange Act's disclosure and antifraud provisions.
'The periodic disclosure filings are public documents. Furthermore, under the SEC's
Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval System ("EDGAR"), investment ana-
lysts may easily access this information through a computer link to the SEC or other ar-
chival sources. See Regulation S-T, Exchange Act, 17 CFR §§ 232.10 et seq (providing
general rules and regulations for electronic filings). See also Bloomenthal and Holme,
Roberts & Owen, Securities Law Handbook §§ 13.01-13.10 (cited in note 27) (providing an
overview of the EDGAR system).
' Transactions occurring under Section 5 are also subject to the more stringent anti-
fraud provisions of Sections 11 and 12(aX2) of the Securities Act; moreover, any technical
violations of Section 5 make the seller liable for recission under Section 12(aX) of the Se-
curities Act. See Section 12(aXl), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 771(aXl).
'Section 5(c), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e(c). Offers, furthermore, are
construed broadly, greatly limiting the ability of issuers and their associates to release in-
formation relating to the offering. See Section 2(3), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC §
77b(3); Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and Effective Date of a
Registration Statement Under the Securities Act, SEC Securities Act Release No 5009, 1
Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 1465 (Oct 7, 1969); Publication of Information Prior to or After
Effective Date of Registration Statement, SEC Securities Act Release No 3844, 1 Fed
Sec L Rptr (CCH) T1 3250-56 (Oct 8, 1957).
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filed, but before it becomes effective (the "waiting period"), issu-
ers and their associates may not make any sales; furthermore,
written communications are allowed only in the form of a Section
10(b) preliminary prospectus.2 Finally, once the registration
statement becomes effective, sales may commence and written
material other than the statutory prospectus may be sent to po-
tential investors, but only if a Section 10(a) statutory prospectus
is sent either prior to or concurrently with the communication to
investors (the "post-effective period").' 1 Section 5 does not limit
its reach solely to issuer-initiated transactions; rather, Section 5
sweeps broadly, regulating every offer and sale of a security."
Under Section 5's terms, even secondary market transactions be-
tween two individual investors must satisfy the registration
process or else qualify for an available exemption within the Se-
curities Act. 9 The effectiveness of a registration statement,
however, lapses after a certain period of time." Accordingly, re-
sellers in the secondary market cannot rely on the registration
statement under which the securities were initially sold to sat-
isfy Section 5(a).
Through a series of broad exemptions for most secondary
market transactions, however, the Securities Act confines its op-
eration primarily to the offering of securities in the securities
market by an issuer or a control person of the issuer.'' The vast
majority of secondary market transactions are exempted from
Section 5 through Section 4(1), which places all transactions not
involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer outside the reach of
Section 5.132 Although the definition of underwriter is broad,"
'See Section 5(bXl), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e(bX) (prohibiting
transmission of non-10(b) prospectus); Section 2(10), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC §
77b(10) (defining "prospectus").
'See Section 5(bX2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e(bX2) (prohibiting sale of
security without accompanying or preceding 10(b) prospectus); Section 2(10), Securities
Act, codified at 15 USC § 77b(10) (defining "prospectus").
'Section 2(3) of the Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77b(3), broadly defines an
"offer" of a security to include solicitations of offers.
'"See text accompanying notes 144-49 (describing the different exemptions to Section
5).
'" See Section 6(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77f(a) ("A registration state-
ment shall be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to
be offered."). Almost from the start, the SEC has viewed Section 6(a) as mandating that
the registration of securities other than those the issuer intended to offer in the near fu-
ture is misleading. See In re Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 SEC 109, 113 (1941).
"Those that assist a control person in selling her securities are considered under-
writers. See Section 2(11), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77b(11).
'See Section 4(1), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77d(1) (exempting transac-
tions "by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer"). See also Section 4(3)-
(4), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77d(3)-(4) (exempting certain dealer transactions
and unsolicited broker transactions).
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most secondary market transactions of registered securities do
not involve such an underwriter, and therefore may rely on the
Section 4(1) exemption.'
The complex machinery of the Securities Act manifests itself
primarily in three areas, each regulating the path that securities
may travel from an issuer or control person of the issuer to the
general securities marketplace. These three areas broadly cover
public offerings, nonpublic offerings, and resales of restricted se-
curities. For each area, problems caused by the Securities Act
transaction-based approach are discussed below.
a) Public offerings. The starkest contrast between the cur-
rent transaction-focused system under the Securities Act and a
potential company registration regime is in the treatment of se-
curities of the same company and class that happen to enter the
market at different times and in a different manner. Take Re-
alco, a company seeking to raise capital through sales of securi-
ties in the public capital markets. Realco may register one mil-
lion shares of common stock with the SEC and sell these securi-
ties through a public offering. A secondary market may then de-
velop and each subsequent secondary market seller may conduct
transactions, without regard to the Securities Act's registration
requirements, through Section 4(1)'s exemption.' After its pub-
lic offering, however, Realco may not authorize additional equity
shares for sale to the general market without separately regis-
tering these securities. Even where Realco authorizes shares of
the same class of common stock, because of the transaction focus
within Section 5, Realco must register the new shares sepa-
'Section 2(11) of the Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77(bXll) defines the term
"underwriter" to include not only all traditional institutions participating in a public of-
fering, but also all purchasers who buy with a view toward resale, or who otherwise
"participate" in the offering.
'More troublesome is the presence of a broker in almost all secondary market trans-
actions. Section 2(12), codified at 15 USC § 77(bX2), defines dealer to include the "agent,
broker, or principal" in a securities transaction, excluding all transactions involving bro-
kers at least literally from Section 4(1)'s exemption. But in combination with Section
4(3)'s nonparticipating dealers exemption, codified at 15 USC § 77(dX3), and Section 4(4)'s
unsolicited broker transaction exemption, codified at 15 USC § 77(dX4), courts have held
that the mere presence of a broker does not disqualify a transaction from exemption un-
der Section 4(1). See Ackerberg v Johnson, 892 F2d 1328, 1334 n 4 (8th Cir 1989) ("While
it is true that § 4(1) exempts transactions and not individuals... the mere involvement
of a broker, qua broker, in a secondary transaction by persons other than an issuer, un-
derwriter or dealer is insufficient to vitiate the exemption.").
'Note, however, that Realco may have to satisfy the periodic information disclosure
requirements under Section 13 of the Exchange Act. See notes 6-7 (summarizing the pe-
riodic disclosure requirements). Nevertheless, most non-issuer secondary market parties
need not provide any affirmative information.
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
rately."36 The shares may possess the same voting, dividend, and
liquidation rights; investors may value the shares the same, re-
quiring similar information in calculating this value. From the
investor's perspective, the shares are identical. Nevertheless, the
trading status of individual units of a particular class of securi-
ties depends on the transaction-specific path that the securities
take to investors. Where Realco's securities trade in an efficient
market, however, it is unclear what is gained from treating secu-
rities differently that are in fact identical from the perspective of
investors. Regardless of the path the securities take to the mar-
ket, investors may rely on publicly available information common
to the company in assessing the value of the securities. Con-
versely, where Realco's securities do not trade in an efficient
market, then it is also unclear why the two different sets of Re-
alco common stock should be treated differently. In both cases,
relatively little public information will exist on the securities; in-
vestors transacting in either set of securities must make do with
whatever information they individually hold.
At least for companies in an efficient market, one of the
greatest advantages of a company registration system is its
elimination of the need to register repeatedly securities of the
same class." Because entire companies are registered, investors
may freely purchase any security of the registered company;
rather than becoming a focal point for regulation and disclosure,
primary transactions simply are treated as any other major in-
formation event. Note, however, as this Article discusses below,
as the cost of conducting repeated registrations of securities di-
minishes-through shelf offerings, for example' 3 -- this advan-
tage of formal company registration diminishes. Likewise, a true
company registration system would similarly restrict the trading
of securities of lightly followed companies with little public in-
formation regardless of the path the securities took to market.
The Advisory Committee, however, does not examine this possi-
bility, instead focusing exclusively on the implications of com-
pany registration for companies trading in an efficient market
only.
The transaction focus of public offerings also manifests itself
in the actual distribution of information during the offering. A
'See Section 6(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77f(a) ("A registration state-
ment shall be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to
be offered.").
See Cohen, 79 Harv L Rev at 1340-44 (cited in note 3) (illustrating varied results
from similar situations under current disclosure system).
'See text accompanying note 262.
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specified set of information must be included in the statutory
prospectus under Section 10(a);139 Section 5(b)(2), in turn, re-
quires that the statutory prospectus accompany or precede the
delivery of securities to purchasers.'40 In a market where little is
known about companies' securities and potential investors must
individually determine the investment value of the securities,
mandating information disclosure directly to potential investors
has some merit. Without such disclosures, the investors may
never learn or make use of company-specific information. Re-
quiring the distribution of the prospectus to these individual in-
vestors, or to their investment advisors, may therefore reduce in-
vestors' overall cost of analyzing the offering's value. Note, how-
ever, that even for such lesser known companies, the interests of
other stakeholders in the company are affected through the of-
fering; nevertheless, only potential investors in the new securi-
ties are provided information. The transaction focus of the Secu-
rities Act's distribution of information fails to provide prior
stakeholders with any information directly. Continuing with the
Realco example, suppose Realco in fact trades in an inefficient
market and little information is publicly available on Realco.
Prior to Realco's first offering of common stock, assume that Re-
alco sold $10 million worth of bonds through another public of-
fering also into a thinly traded and lightly followed market. The
value of the bonds changes based on the offering of common
stock: more equity raises the cushion of assets protecting bond-
holders in case of insolvency and thereby reduces the risk of de-
fault on the bonds, raising the bonds' value. The bondholders,
however, do not receive the information disclosures related to the
common stock offering under the current prospectus delivery re-
quirement.'4 '
Suppose alternatively that Realco is widely followed in an ef-
ficient market and financial analysts may easily obtain the in-
formation contained in the common stock offering prospectus ei-
ther through brokers involved in the offering or directly from the
SEC. For Realco investors, under these circumstances, it may not
matter that the information on the offering is initially distrib-
uted only to the public offering purchasers and not to prior
stakeholders; the efficient market will incorporate the informa-
tion into secondary market prices. If Realco truly trades in an ef-
'See Section 10(a), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77j(a).
"See Section 5(bX2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77e(bX2).
... In this example, the value of the bonds increases. However, had the subsequent of-
fering been of first mortgage bonds with senior priority, the value of the bonds might ac-
tually decline.
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ficient market, however, then even public offering purchasers do
not require the information contained within the prospectus.
Rather, so long as the information is distributed to investment
professionals in some manner, the information will become in-
corporated in the secondary market price of the shares and
thereby reflect itself in the offering price.' In an efficient mar-
ket, therefore, the distribution of information solely through a
filing with a centralized, easily accessible information source,
such as the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Re-
trieval System ("EDGAR), may actually increase investor wel-
fare, while lessening the cost to issuers of conducting a public of-
fering.
b) Nonpublic offerings. In deciding to raise capital through
the securities markets, issuers are not constrained to follow the
public offering process dictated by Section 5. The Securities Act
furnishes several avenues to conduct either a nonpublic offering
or a public offering of more limited scope. Under each exemption,
the requirements imposed under the Securities Act focus pri-
marily on the specific transaction involved. Although some of
these transaction-specific requirements take into account the
status of the issuer, they do so only within the confines of the
particular transaction. Exemptions are provided for purely intra-
state offerings,' offerings essentially nonpublic in character un-
der Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 45 Regulation D private
placements,' small-size offerings through Regulation A,'47 and
offshore transactions pursuant to Regulation S.' For conven-
ience of analysis, this Section focuses solely on private place-
.. Of course, there is no requirement that the issuer peg its offering price to the sec-
ondary market price. Where the offering price is greater than the secondary market price
for the same class of securities, however, investors will refuse to purchase the offering;,
similarly, where the offering price is below the secondary market price, the issuer may
raise its offering proceeds simply by raising the offering price up to the secondary market
price. The offering price will accordingly correlate closely with the secondary market
price.
'"Temporary Rules and Forms for the Pilot Electronic Disclosure System, SEC Secu-
rities Act Release No 6539, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 83,642 (June
27, 1984) (SEC's temporary rules for EDGAR, adapting existing SEC rules to accommo-
date electronic filing); Electronic Filing, Processing and Information Dissemination Sys-
tem, SEC Securities Act Release No 6519, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr
(CCH) 83,600 (Mar 22, 1984) (announcing introduction of EDGAR pilot program).
'"Section 3(a)(11), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77c(a)(11); Rule 147, Securities
Act, 17 CFR § 230-147 (1996).
'"Section 4(2), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77(dX2).
"Rules 501-08, Regulation D, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.501-08 (1996).
' Rules 251-63, Regulation A, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.251-63 (1996).
'Rules 901-04, Regulation S, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.901-04 (1996).
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ments. The analysis, nevertheless, carries through to the other
transaction exemptions."
Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, for example, provide two
alternate means of issuing securities in a nonpublic manner un-
der Sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the Securities Act, respectively. Rule
505 requires that the total dollar amount of the offering not ex-
ceed five million dollars, and that the number of purchasers of
the securities not exceed thirty-five.5 ' Rule 506, in contrast, sets
no dollar limit on the offering; rather, Rule 506 limits the num-
ber of purchasers to thirty-five and requires that each purchaser
meet a sophistication requirement. 5' Under either exemption,
certain highly qualified investors-deemed accredited investors
under Rule 501-are not counted as "purchasers" and are not
part of the thirty-five-investor limit.'52
From the perspective of an individual transaction, Regula-
tion D's safe harbors make some sense. In isolation, Regulation D
ensures that those investors able to fend for themselves are given
the opportunity to participate in a private offering without the
high cost of compliance with Section 5's registration require-
ments. 3 This transaction perspective, however, ignores that
other investors besides participants in the private placement of-
''Although the other exemptions from Section 5 contain different prerequisites, they
all take a transaction-based focus and, as a result, impose complex restrictions on resales.
For example, issuers and control persons may seek to avoid the requirements of Section 5
through off-shore offerings of securities meeting the requirements of Regulation S. Under
Regulation S, securities sold in an offshore transaction through a distribution not tar-
geting the United States are exempt from Section 5's registration requirements. Rule
903, Regulation S, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.903 (1996). Even issuers incorporated in
the United States may use Regulation S to issue securities solely in France, for example,
without any promotional effort in the United States, and thereby avoid Section 5's regis-
tration requirements. The transaction-based approach of Regulation S, however, imposes
complex resale restrictions on these securities even though the U.S. issuer may have se-
curities of the same class trading in the United States concurrently. See, for example,
Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law (forthcoming Nw J Intl L & Bus) (describing how company registration
may alleviate the flowback problem of Regulation S).
Rule 505, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.505 (1996).
"Rule 506, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.506 (1996). Rule 506 requires that "[e]ach
purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser represen-
tative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment .. Rule
506(bX2Xii), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.506(bX2Xii) (1996).
2See Rule 501(a), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.501(a) (1996) (defining "accredited in-
vestor ).
'Investors, for example, that are deemed "accredited" as defined under Rule 501(a)-
including individuals with a net worth of over $1 million or an annual income of over
$200,000-may participate in a Rule 505 or 506 offering without counting toward the
limit on the number of purchasers and without any mandatory information disclosure.
See Rule 501(a), 501(e), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.501(a), (e) (1996).
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fering are affected by the offering. Other stakeholders in the is-
suer are affected by the change in capitalization from the private
placement. Broadly speaking, even a private placement is an in-
formation event for all the stakeholders of the issuer. As with
other significant events, the transaction affects the valuation of
the issuer and is relevant to all investors." 4 Although not impor-
tant for companies that trade in an efficient market, this lack of
information disclosure may be important for less followed com-
panies and their prior stakeholders. 5
c) Restricted resales. Securities sold through one of the ex-
emptions from Section 5's registration requirements typically as-
sume restricted status. As restricted securities, purchasers are
unable to resell the securities to other investors without meeting
another transaction exemption. Furthermore, Section 4(1)'s ex-
emption for transactions not involving an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer often is not available to these investors. The expansive
definition of underwriter under Section 2(11) treats investors
that purchase with a view to distribute as underwriters.15
Whether an investor has a view to distribute depends on the in-
vestor's motive at the time of purchase and the type of resale in
which the investor engages. 57 In practice, investors typically re-
quire at least a three-year holding period to obtain a presump-
tion of investment motive and thereby escape classification as an
underwriter directly under Section 2(11).5' To provide more cer-
' The transaction may affect the valuation of the issuer from the perspective of an
individual investor in several different ways. First, the mere fact that the issuer is raising
additional capital may signal that the issuer is about to engage in a project requiring
such capital. Second, the choice of a private placement may also provide a signal about
the issuer's intentions and attitude toward information disclosure to the public market.
Finally, the creation of additional securities may affect the value of existing securities
holders-particularly where the securities are of a different class and hold different vot-
ing, dividend, or liquidation rights. For example, holders of junior notes may find that
their liquidity cushion against the issuer's bankruptcy is adversely affected after the is-
suer sells senior notes into the market.
Small-sized offerings are also potentially exempt under Rule 504 of Regulation D.
Rule 504 allows issuers to issue up to one million dollars worth of securities; unlike Rules
505 and 506, Rule 504 does not impose any limitations on the number of purchasers. See
Rule 504, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.504 (1996). Similarly, Regulation A allows certain
issuers to raise up to five million dollars through a public offering without meeting the in-
formation requirements of Section 5; rather, issuers under Regulation A must put forth
an offering circular. See Rules 251-63, Regulation A, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.251-63
(1996).
'See Section 2(11), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77b(11).
15 In Gilligan, Will & Co v SEC, 267 F2d 461,464-68 (2d Cir 1959), the Second Circuit
held that an investor who sought to resell restricted securities ten months after purchase
from the issuer because the issuer's circumstances had changed lacked investment mo-
tive and, therefore, was participating in the issuer's original distribution as an under-
writer.
'See, for example, A.A_ Sommer, Jr., Considerations Leading to the Adoption of Rule
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tainty for investors seeking to resell their restricted securities in
the public capital markets, the SEC instituted Rule 144 in
1972.9 Rule 144 provides that investors meeting the rule's two-
year holding period, 6 ' volume limitation, 6 ' information, 6 2 and
manner of sale requirements" are not Section 2(11) underwrit-
ers and therefore may take advantage of the Section 4(1) exemp-
tion to resell restricted securities into the public capital mar-
kets.' Through Rule 144, securities sold in one of the transac-
tion exemptions to Section 5 may eventually become freely traded
in a public market.
Suppose Midco, a relatively small company, made a private
placement of $5 million common stock in 1980 with thirty indi-
vidual investors 6 and today trades on the over-the-counter "pink
sheets" market and has assets worth only $4 million and fewer
than five hundred shareholders of record." Under Rule 144 and
Section 4(1), investors may freely trade Midco's securities with-
out any affirmative information disclosure requirements from ei-
ther the Securities Act or Exchange Act."' This is despite the fact
that, without information and given the thin nature of the trad-
144, 67 Nw U L Rev 65, 69 (Supp 1972). Even without investment motive, however, so
long as the resale takes place within the same scope as the original offering, the resale is
not considered a "distribution." Therefore, where investor X purchases bonds from Realco
through a private placement to only accredited investors, so long as X resells only to
other accredited investors, the private placement exemption is met and X is not consid-
ered an underwriter under Section 2(11). See Cox, Casebook at 455-57 (cited in note 54).
' See Adoption of Rule 144, SEC Securities Act Release No 5223, 37 Fed Reg 591 (Jan
11, 1972).
" Rule 144(d) requires that a minimum of two years must elapse between the date of
acquisition from the issuer (or the issuer's affiliate) and the resale of securities for Rule
144 to apply. Rule 144(d), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(d) (1996).
.., See Rule 144(e), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(e) (1996) (providing different vol-
ume limitations for affiliates and nonaffiiates of the issuer).
"See Rule 144(c), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(c) (1996) (detailing the require-
ment that there exist adequate public information on the issuer of the restricted securi-
ties).
"See Rule 144(f), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(f) (1996) (requiring that the re-
stricted securities be resold in "broker's transactions" as defined in Rule 144(g), Securities
Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(g) (1996)). Notice of the proposed sale must also be filed with the
SEC under Rule 144(h), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(h) (1996).
'" See Rule 144(b), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(b) (1996). Rule 144 also requires
that a notice of the proposed sales be filed with the SEC. See Rule 144(h), Securities Act,
17 CFR § 230.144(h) (1996). Three years after the purchase from the issuer, however,
nonaffiliates may ignore the volume limitation, information, manner of sale, and notice
requirements of Rule 144. See Rule 144(k), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144(k) (1996).
"'Midco may make this sale using Rule 505's private placement exemption, for exam-
ple. See Rule 505, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.505 (1996).
'" Midco, as a result, is not required under Section 13 of the Exchange Act to make
periodic filings with the SEC. See Section 13, Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m.
"'Note, however, that Rule 15c2-11 of the Exchange Act, 17 CFR § 240.15c2-11
(1996), may impose some information requirements on broker-dealers. See note 246.
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ing market for such a small issue of securities, investors are at
high risk for fraud and speculative pricing.
On the other hand, suppose Fidco is a large, Exchange-Act
reporting multinational company with billions in assets and $10
billion in publicly traded common stock. Fidco chooses in early
1997 to make a private placement of $5 million of its common
stock. Because of the transaction focus of the Securities Act, the
private placement common stock is restricted even though an ac-
tive public market exists for the same class of common stock. Al-
though both sets of common stock offer identical risks, returns,
and voting rights from the investors' standpoint, the Securities
Act's transaction focus forces the trading status of the shares to
turn on their path into the market. Comparing Midco and Fidco,
the transaction focus of the Securities Act allows shares of Midco
to be freely traded, even though no public information exists on
the stocks simply because the shares were sold a number of years
in the past; on the other hand, Fidco private placement shares
are not tradable, even though investors have a wealth of infor-
mation on Fidco.
In summary, the current Securities Act regime is con-
structed with the purpose of forcing issuers to provide informa-
tion on a transaction-focused basis. It is, however, puzzling that
the focus is on issuers and not on investors.'68 Investor protection
is the primary goal of securities regulation. A status-based re-
gime that focused on providing information to investors and tai-
lored regulation to the amount of information already available
in the market on a particular issuer may better serve this goal of
investor protection. Where information is lacking-perhaps be-
cause the issuer has only sold securities through private place-
ment transactions-resales should be limited, perhaps to only in-
stitutional investors. On the other hand, where information on
the issuer is abundant, both issuers and investors should be al-
lowed to sell securities freely. If the offering of new securities al-
ters the company's capitalization and valuation, the offering
should be treated as a significant company event and disclosed to
all investors and not only to offerees and purchasers of the par-
ticular transaction.'69 As the next Section discusses, the Ex-
change Act, in fact, takes a status-based approach, as embodied
in the periodic reporting requirements.
1
" See, for example, Cohen, 79 Harv L Rev at 1341-42 (cited in note 3).
" Perhaps companies can satisfy this disclosure requirement through the Form 8-K
filing.
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2. Exchange Act.
In contrast to the Securities Act, the Exchange Act focuses
on the secondary markets, where millions of securities, involving
a wide variety of amounts and parties, are exchanged daily."
Following the rationale of the Securities Act's resale provisions,
individual investors are not required to provide information on a
transaction-by-transaction basis. The information requirements
of the Exchange Act instead work to ensure that companies pro-
vide the markets and the SEC periodically with an adequate
amount of information. The amount of information required de-
pends on the particular status of the company. Section 13 of the
Exchange Act imposes periodic reporting requirements on all
companies registered on any national securities exchange under
Section 12(b);' 7' Section 13, similarly, results in periodic report-
ing requirements pursuant to Section 12(g) for companies with
greater than 500 shareholders of record for any given class of se-
curities and with assets totaling more than $10 million.'12 Fi-
nally, Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act imposes periodic re-
porting requirements for new initial public offering companies
until the first fiscal year in which the company has fewer than
300 shareholders of record.73
Under the Exchange Act's periodic reporting requirements,
issuers must file with the SEC annual Form 10-K, quarterly
Form 1O-Q, and occasional Form 8-K documents. 74 The SEC's
EDGAR system provides investors an electronic means of ac-
cessing this information directly.75 Aimed at the secondary mar-
ket as a whole, Exchange Act disclosure relies on the ability of
investment analysts and investors to access information filed
with the SEC.
B. The Advisory Committee Proposal
In response to the complexities and tensions created by the
current regime's dual transaction- and status-based approaches,
"Given that the equity trading markets were thirty-five times larger than the pri-
mary markets as of 1995, the Exchange Act's regulations cover a much wider scope of
transactions than the Securities Act. See Advisory Committee Report at 14 & n 4 (cited in
note 13).
71 Section 13, Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m; Section 12(b), Exchange Act,
codified at 15 USC § 781(b).
'Section 13, Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m; Section 12(g), Exchange Act,
codified at 15 USCA § 781(g), as applied by Rule 12g-1, Exchange Act, 17 CFR § 240.12g-1
(1996) (raising the asset requirement to $10 million).
"'Section 15(d), Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78o(d).
,' See note 7 (describing periodic reporting requirements).
'See note 123 (citing sources on EDGAR).
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the SEC's Advisory Committee and other commentators have put
forth several reform proposals aimed at formally instituting
company registration and disclosure. The Advisory Committee
Report, however, presents a curious mixture of proposals directly
related to creating a company registration system and other pro-
posals not necessarily dependent on company registration. Some
of these peripheral reforms are in part justified by the impact of
a shift toward company registration on disclosure quality, due
diligence investigations, and the timing of the securities registra-
tion process. Others, however, stand almost completely inde-
pendent of the company registration system and should be ana-
lyzed separately. To the extent they prove worthwhile, the SEC
and Congress may wish to apply such reforms to the current Se-
curities Act regime even should company registration never be-
come implemented. This Section (1) discusses the reform propos-
als directly related to company registration; (2) reviews the pe-
ripheral reforms; and (3) finally discusses the shortcomings of
the Advisory Committee's Report.
1. Company registration.
At its heart, the Advisory Committee's proposed company
registration system establishes a form of continuous shelf regis-
tration system.7 s Companies entering the company registration
regime are required to file a new Form C-1 with the SEC con-
taining "a generic description of the type of securities the issuer
anticipated issuing, as well as a general discussion of its financ-
ing plans."7 ' After the initial filing of Form C-i, the information
in the Form C-1 document would be kept current by incorporat-
ing all existing Exchange Act filings, including Form 10-K, 10-Q,
and 8-K filings." s The continuous registration statement for Sec-
tion 5 and Section 11 purposes then consists of the original Form
C-1 and all incorporated documents.' Company registration is
'See Advisory Committee Report at 20 (cited in note 13) ("Mhe company-
registration system essentially will make the Form C-I the equivalent of a shelf registra-
tion statement that is applicable on a continuous basis for all future offerings.").
1
"Id at 80.
"Id at 22 ("Much like today, companies also would file Exchange Act reports, which
would automatically be incorporated into the Form C-i, and the information in the com-
pany's public file would then form the primary basis for decisions by the investing public
with respect to a registered company's securities."); id at 80-81 (describing company regis-
tration scheme in more detail).
'Id at 80-81. The two main benefits claimed by the Advisory Committee over today's
shelf registration under Rule 415 are that: "[Tihe current limitations of the shelf registra-
tion system on the amount of securities that could be registered would be eliminated, as
would the need to file a new registration statement to register additional securities." Id at
9. Rule 415 currently allows S-3 companies to register only up to 10 percent of a corn-
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targeted initially only at "pilot" companies that meet the follow-
ing requirements: the "completion of an initial public offering, a
two-year reporting history, $75 million public float, and a class of
securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ-NMS stock market.""s
Although providing a new continuous shelf-offering system,
the Advisory Committee's proposal retains a significant transac-
tion-based element. The proposal divides and regulates compa-
nies based on the nature of the offering transaction. 8' Four types
of equity offerings are possible. De minimis equity offerings are
defined as an offering of less than 3 percent of the public float of
the security in a period of any three business days. Routine eq-
uity offerings involve greater than or equal to 3 percent and less
than 20 percent of the public float. Nonroutine equity offerings
consist of offerings greater than or equal to 20 percent and less
than 40 percent of the public float. Finally, extraordinary equity
offerings include all offerings greater than or equal to 40 percent
of the public float. The proposal also treats all nonconvertible
debt offerings separately as a class.
During an offering of securities, 8 2 issuers are required to file
transaction-specific information on the offering-including the of-
fering amount, the identity of selling security holders, the use of
proceeds, and the plan of distribution-with the SEC, either as a
Form 8-K filing or a prospectus supplement, depending on the
type of transaction." For non-de minimis equity offerings, issu-
ers must file a Form 8-K statement with the SEC.'" Through the
Form 8-K filing, the transaction-specific information is incorpo-
rated into the registration statement and brought under the cov-
erage of Section 11 liability." Issuers making a de minimis
transaction, in contrast, may elect at their discretion to forego a
Form 8-K filing and file a prospectus supplement with the SEC
instead. Because the prospectus supplement does not become
pany's outstanding voting equity for "at the market" offerings; furthermore, the company
must reasonably expect to issue its shelf-registered equity within two years of its regis-
tration. See Rule 415, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.415 (1996).
'Advisory Committee Report at 93 (cited in note 13). Roughly 30 percent of all re-
porting companies qualify for the pilot. Id at 95.
" 
11d at 24-27.
'Note that initial public offerings and offerings of securities not valued on the basis
of the issuer's business and financial information (for example, asset-based or special
purpose issues) are not eligible for company registration. Id at 99-100.
Id at 22-23.
"'Id at 23.
'Id. The Advisory Committee also argues that the Form 8-K will serve as a focal
point to facilitate due diligence inquiries of underwriters, auditors, and other third par-
ties. Id at 82.
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part of the registration statement, the transaction-specific infor-
mation comes only under Section 12(a)(2) liability protection.186
In all cases where a Form 8-K is filed, updating information on
material company-related disclosure not yet in the Form C-1
public file would be required to be fied some period of time be-
fore the sale to provide the market with an ample period to take
this information into account.187 Issuers of all types of transac-
tions must also make a post-effective amendment to the registra-
tion statement in the event that the company undergoes a
"fundamental change.""
For issuers under the company registration system, the gun-
jumping rules governing pre-effective offers to potential investors
are effectively eliminated."8 9 The current gun-jumping rules un-
der Section 5 impose large costs. Reporting companies in par-
ticular suffer from the double burden of providing material in-
formation to the investing public while at the same time, before a
public offering, avoiding anything that might condition the mar-
ket.9" For example, where the offering may radically change the
value of the company for current investors, reporting companies
are placed in a bind as to whether to inform the current investors
of the offering or remain silent for fear of advertising the offering
prior to the effective date. Furthermore, it is unclear what is
gained by restricting pre-offering information for reporting com-
panies. In particular, the large, well followed pilot companies
typically have many institutional owners as well as investment
analysts tracking the performance and valuation of the pilot
companies' securities.' For such companies, therefore, there ex-
ists little risk that pre-effective information disclosures from the
issuer will cause the market to launch into a speculative
frenzy." Even if smaller investors are present, the weight of in-
'Issuers pay a minor registration fee when they first file their Form C-1. Thereafter,
the system would operate on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, depending on the amount of securi-
ties issued. Id at 22.
" Id at 24.
'MId at 25-27, 83. This parallels the requirement imposed under current Rule 415
that issuers comply with item 512(a) of Regulation S-K to make a post-effective amend-
ment to reflect any fundamental changes. See Rule 415(aX3), Securities Act, 17 CFR §
230.415(aX3) (1996).
' See Advisory Committee Report at 16 (cited in note 13).
'Id ("Statutory limitations and regulatory restrictions on solicitation activities prior
to and during the registration process make it difficult for reporting companies to distin-
guish between permitted and prohibited market communications.").
" See note 54 (detailing data on the incidence of analysts for companies) and note 58
(detailing data on the incidence of institutional investors).
'See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, SEC Release No 5180, 1 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 3056 (Aug 16, 1971)
(listing rationale of gun-jumping rules to stop conditioning market).
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stitutional money will maintain the secondary market stock price
of the issuer at or near its fundamental value. This will force the
issuer in turn to keep its offering price also anchored to the com-
pany's fundamental value. For pilot companies, then, the fear of
unduly conditioning the market prior to the offering seems un-
founded and unnecessary, especially where this fear chills the
normal flow of information into the market.19
With each new issue of securities, the Advisory Committee's
proposal would allow issuers to fulfill Section 5's prospectus de-
livery requirement through a document of its own choosing. Ac-
cording to the Committee, this change gives issuers the flexibility
to fashion the prospectus more as a marketing document, pro-
viding more readable and understandable information to inves-
tors. 9' Depending on the type of transaction, both general com-
pany as well as transaction-specific information would be incor-
porated by reference into the statutory prospectus.'95 Issuers of
de minimis and routine offerings, for instance, would be allowed
to incorporate both transaction-related and company information
into the statutory prospectus by reference. Issuers of nonroutine
and extraordinary offerings, in contrast, would not be allowed to
incorporate transactional information by reference except for
prospectuses targeting accredited investors.'96 For all but ex-
"Note, however, that the elimination of the gun-jumping rules is not necessarily a
feature of the company registration process. This elimination parallels the reduced im-
portance of gun-jumping rules in today's shelf registration system. Companies under Rule
415 must obey the gun-jumping rules while obtaining their universal shelf registration;
thereafter, however, they may issue securities freely without concern for the gun-jumping
rules. Furthermore, nothing in today's registration process is inconsistent with a reform
to eliminate only the gun-jumping aspects of the system. Congress or the SEC could
maintain the current transaction-based framework and simply do away with their gun-
jumping rule aspect.
'Advisory Committee Report at 83 (cited in note 13) ("A principal goal of the Com-
mittee has been to recast the prospectus from what in many cases is its current func-
tion-a document prepared to comply with regulatory requirements and to provide the is-
suer with a defense in the event of litigation, which often is not sent to investors until af-
ter the investment decision is made-into a tool to convey meaningful information at the
time of the investment decision."). Note, however, that "plain English" reform of prospec-
tuses is not a unique feature of company registration. The SEC, in fact, recently insti-
tuted a pilot program aimed at introducing more "plain English7 prospectuses within the
current regime. See Bell Atlantic, NYNEX First to File "Plain English" Disclosure Docu-
ments, 28 Sec Reg L Rep (Sept 13, 1996); Disclosure: SEC Plain English Initiative is One
ofLevitt's 'Highest Priorities", 28 Sec Reg L Rep 971 (Aug 9, 1996).
'Note that where the issuer is offering a new security, the Advisory Committee
would require the issuer to disclose the terms of the new security and the specific risks of
the security directly to potential investors, without the benefit of incorporation by refer-
ence. Advisory Committee Report at 83 (cited in note 13).
1 As with S-3 offering prospectuses, however, pilot companies would be allowed to in-
corporate nontransactional, company-related information by reference into the prospec-
tus. Id at 87. The Advisory Committee, furthermore, would require that issuers deliver
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traordinary transactions, the SEC would abstain from conducting
any direct review of the Form C-1 or transactional disclosures
prior to an offering; the SEC, however, would retain the right to
review periodic Exchange Act disclosures. 9
7
In addition to continuous shelf registration and prospectus-
delivery reform, the Advisory Committee's proposal presents one
final major feature: the elimination of most of the complex resale
limitations surrounding restricted securities.'98 Because securi-
ties of issuers within the company registration system are regis-
tered already, there is little need to issue them through a private
placement. The Advisory Committee, however, remained am-
bivalent toward the exact role private placements and other ex-
emptions should play in the company registration system.'99
Rather than decide the issue, the Advisory Committee instead
chose to allow pilot companies to elect either to join the full com-
pany registration system or opt for a modified form of company
registration. Under the full company registration system, issuers
and affiliates would lose the right to use any of the transactional
exemptions except for certain exempt securities."' Issuers, how-
ever, would be able to make use of a "limited placement" and sell
a limited amount of restricted securities to one or more accred-
ited investors.Y' Significantly, the Advisory Committee recom-
mends eliminating any fixed holding period for the limited ex-
emption securities; instead, securities would remain restricted
until full disclosure is made to the public in a Form 8-K or other
public filing.2 Full company registration companies would also
be allowed to make private placements of nonconvertible debt se-
curities to institutions during the pilot period.0 3 Issuers selecting
the modified regime, on the other hand, would retain the right to
engage in one of the current regime's transaction exemptions
this prospectus before investors purchase the security. Id.
' Id at 22, 89-90. Under the current system, the SEC may choose to review any regis-
tration document. The SEC, however, pursues a policy of selective review for all filings
other than initial public offering filings. From 1994 to 1995, for example, the SEC re-
viewed 13.9 percent of the total number of non-shelf S-3 filings. Id at 47-48.
Id at 8-9, 17, 22.
""Id at 100 ('The Committee engaged in considerable discussion on whether compa-
nies participating in the company-registration system should be able to rely on exemp-
tions for private placements and other transactions that are available today from the
registration and liability provisions of the Securities Act.").
mid at 101.
" Id at 102. Securities sold as part of a limited placement would be restricted. Inves-
tors would be able to resell such securities only after "full disclosure is provided to the
public through a Form 8-K or other public filing of such information and its inclusion in
the Form C-1." Id.
Id.
Id at 81.
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separate from the company registration system."4 Even under
the modified system, however, the decreased cost of making a
registered offering under the company system would greatly di-
minish the volume of the transactional exemptions, reducing the
importance of the complex resale restrictions."5
The core of the Advisory Committee's proposals brings the
current Securities Act regime into a company registration format
through the perpetual extension of the shelf registration. Form
C-1 essentially represents the continuous shelf registration
document. Combined with a broad concept of incorporation by
reference into the prospectus, the Advisory Committee's proposal
makes it relatively inexpensive for registered companies seeking
to issue securities through a public offering. Although some secu-
rities of the same class may still face disparate treatment as re-
stricted securities, the Advisory Committee's proposal, by re-
ducing the role of private placements and other transaction ex-
emptions from Section 5, does achieve equal treatment for most
securities of the same company.
2. Peripheral proposals.
In addition to introducing continuous shelf registration, the
Advisory Committee suggests a number of peripheral reforms de-
signed to enhance and complement the move toward company
registration. None of these reforms is necessary to company reg-
istration; furthermore, they may also be easily applied to today's
transaction-based regime. ' The Advisory Committee, neverthe-
less, justifies these proposals as required to strengthen investor
protections in light of the impact of a company registration sys-
tem on disclosure and due diligence practices.2 7
First, the Advisory Committee calls for an expansion of anti-
fraud liability covering disclosure documents. 2°" Antifraud liabil-
ity is expanded by extending the reach of both Section 11 and
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Because the company regis-
tration proposal requires that transaction-specific information
and material company updates be filed as an amendment to the
registration statement under Form 8-K for all but debt and de
minimis equity offerings, this information comes within the scope
Id at 101-02.
Id at 100-01.
'Indeed, some members of the Advisory Committee have suggested that these re-
forms be applied independent of the company registration system to today's universal
shelf registration process. Id at 109.
2" Id at 102-03.
2Id at 110-13.
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of Section 11 liability. The Advisory Committee's proposal there-
fore expands the scope of liability currently applied to certain
updates to Rule 415 shelf offering filings. In particular, issuers
making a Rule 415 shelf registration under the current regime
must provide updated information in the form of either a pro-
spectus supplement (for material, nonfundamental changes not
relating to the plan of distribution). 9 or an amendment to the
registration statement (for fundamental changes or material
changes relating to the plan of distribution).210 Where an issuer
conducting a shelf registration, therefore, potentially bears Sec-
tion 11 liability only for fundamental changes or material
changes to the plan of distribution, pilot companies under the
company registration system will face Section 11 liability for all
material company updates. Furthermore, although the company
registration proposal allows issuers to treat their own selling
documents as the "statutory prospectus," this feature of the pro-
posal introduces the possibility of Section 12(a)(2) liability on
what in the current system would be considered "free writing"
and not a prospectus for purposes of either the gun-jumping rules
or antifraud liability. 1'
As discussed in Section I, however, it is unclear that greater
antifraud liability advances investor protection goals.1 In the
face of high costs due to frivolous litigation, more antifraud li-
ability may actually increase the cost of going public. On the
other hand, because a company registration system provides is-
suers the ability to bring securities to market relatively quickly,
"Although not directly imposed under Rule 415, issuers may face a duty to update
the prospectus for material changes from Section 12(aX2), for example, that imposes anti-
fraud liability for material misstatements or omissions necessary in light of prior state-
ments not to make the prospectus materially misleading. See Section 12(a)(2), Securities
Act, codified at 15 USCA § 771(aX2). Rule 424(b), moreover, imposes a requirement that
an updated prospectus embodying "substantive changes from or additions to a previously
filed prospectus" must be filed with the SEC. See Rule 424(b), Securities Act, 17 CFR
§ 230.424(b) (1996).
2
'See Rule 415(a)(3), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.415(aX3) (1996) ("The registrant
furnishes the undertakings required by Item 512(a) of Regulation S-K ... ."); Item
512(a)(ii), Regulation S-K, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 229.512(aXii) (imposing an obligation
on issuers to "reflect in the prospectus any facts or events arising after the effective date
of the registration statement... which, individually or in the aggregate, represent a fun-
damental change in the information set forth in the registration statemen"). Material
changes to the plan of distribution must also be filed as a post-effective amendment to the
registration system. See Item 512(aXiii), Regulation S-K, Securities Act, 17 CFR
§ 229.512(aXiii). Unlike amendments to the registration statement, which are subject to
Section 11 liability, supplements to the prospectus bear only Section 12(aX2) liability risk.
See generally Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 114-
15 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1995) (describing the required undertakings under Rule 415).
"'Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation at 112-13 (cited in note 210).
"See text accompanying notes 34-39.
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the argument goes, third parties may not have time to conduct
an adequate due diligence investigation. Incorporation by refer-
ence of Exchange Act filings, which are typically subject only to
Rule 10b-5 liability, into Securities Act filings may also reduce
the quality of disclosures.213 More inaccurate and incomplete in-
formation disclosures may result.214 This argument, however, ig-
nores the possibility that alternative market-based mechanisms
exist to deter against fraudulent or incomplete disclosures.215
Given that antifraud liability acts as only one substitute for
these other mechanisms, the need for liability diminishes as the
efficacy of the other mechanisms rises. The market-based
mechanisms, moreover, are strongest for larger, highly capital-
ized companies that are well followed in the securities markets.
Although the argument for increased liability may prove correct
on average for Exchange Act filings, the Advisory Committee Re-
port must take into account these differences among compa-
nies.216
.. See Gerald S. Backman and Stephen E. KHim, From disclosure to registration, Bus L
Today 53, 55 (Jan/Feb 1996) (noting that "a 1993 ABA Task Force Report asserted that
diligence may consist of no more than a phone discussion with the issuer the night before
a shelf takedown, consultation with the underwriter's equity analyst following the issuer
and perhaps a quick check of any available ratings information").
It remains somewhat ambiguous whether Exchange Act documents incorporated by
reference into Securities Act filings are subject to Section 11 liability. See, for example,
Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1160 n 45 (cited in note 11) (noting that although Section
11 applies to the annual report on Form 10-K incorporated by reference into a Securities
Act filing, debate exists as to whether Section 11 liability applies to interim Exchange Act
filings).
"'Milton Cohen, for example, argues for an expanded version of Section 18 of the Ex-
change Aces antifraud prohibitions, including third-party liability and a negligence stan-
dard of care. Cohen contends that raising antifraud liability for all Exchange Act disclo-
sures lessens the risk that incorporation by reference into a company registration system
will result in offering disclosures of lower quality. See Cohen, 40 Bus Law at 988-90 (cited
in note 3).
"See Section LB.
" In their separate statement, Advisory Committee members Coffee, Greene, and
Sonsini do present an argument that the due diligence defense for third parties should
vary with the size and character of the offerings. See Advisory Committee Report at 39-40
(cited in note 13) (separate statement). As discussed below, however, it is unclear why
disclosure or antifraud requirements should turn on the size of an individual offering
transaction. See text accompanying notes 239-42. Although larger offerings involve a
greater change in the capitalization of the issuer and perhaps also in the issuer's future
prospects, the larger offering will also attract concomitantly greater attention from the
investment community. Not only will investment analysts assess the issuers more
closely, but the value of reputational certification from third-party intermediaries will
also increase, leading issuers to expend more resources to hire more high-quality inter-
mediaries to screen their offering. Coffee, Greene, and Sonsini are correct, nevertheless,
to call for different levels of due diligence for companies of different "character," focusing
on the high-speed use of shelf-offering transactions by S-3 companies. Even here, how-
ever, they incorrectly rely upon the inability of certifiers or gatekeepers to screen issuers
adequately during rapid access offerings as their rationale. See id at 40 (separate state-
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Second, aware of the role third-party liability plays in con-
trolling the incidence of fraud, the Advisory Committee recom-
mends providing clearer guidelines for third parties who are as-
sociated with the offering and who act as gatekeepers.217 Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act, underwriters are potentially li-
able for material misstatements and omissions in the prospectus
unless they meet a due diligence defense. 18 The Committee sug-
gests "clarifying" the due diligence burden that underwriters and
others must undergo to escape this liability.219 Given the ex-
panded emphasis on gatekeepers, the Committee also suggests
limiting the definition of "underwriters" to protect non-securities
professionals from potential liability.220 But as with the other pe-
ripheral reforms, the expansion and clarification of gatekeeper
duties or the definition of "underwriter" are neither unique to nor
necessary for a company registration system. Moreover, addi-
tional underwriter duties may not necessarily enhance investor
protection. To the extent investors value the underwriters' gate-
keeper role, they will pay more for securities associated with
such a gatekeeper. Issuers, as a result, will have an incentive to
provide underwriters with adequate opportunity to conduct their
gatekeeper investigation. Where investors, however, do not value
underwriters as gatekeepers, imposing legal liability may result
in costly investigation that elevates the transaction cost of an of-
fering without much benefit to investors.
Third, the Advisory Committee Report argues that its pro-
posed company registration system generates more timely dis-
semination of information to investors and more readable and
understandable prospectuses."m Under the proposal, material
updates to general company information are required to be filed
under Form 8-K some-period before the first sale of securities for
ment) ("Gatekeeper liability makes sense only when the gatekeeper is placed in a position
to take effective preventive action."). Where the market values such certification, issuers
will voluntarily provide third parties with the opportunity to engage in a gatekeeping
role; otherwise, the market will penalize the issuer with a greater discount for the is-
suer's shares. Due diligence should vary based on the character of the issuer-, this evalua-
tion, however, should not revolve around size or timing of the offering, but rather on the
presence of alternative antifraud mechanisms as identified above.
211 Id at 113-17.
...See Section 11(b), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77k(b).
2'Advisory Committee Report at 114-15 (cited in note 13).
"'Id at 97 (proposing to limit the statutory definition of underwriter to broker-dealers
acting on behalf of the issuer or affiliate in a distribution).
" Id at 78-88. Under the current shelf registration system, issuers need only file a
prospectus supplement containing updating information within two days after actual
shelf registration takedown sales occur. See Rule 424(b)(2), Securities Act, 17 CFR
§ 230.424(b)(2) (1996).
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all but nonconvertible debt and de minimis equity offerings of se-
curities.2 The Committee therefore argues that the market re-
ceives this information sooner than under the current regime
where information oftentimes arrives only with the final prospec-
tus at the confirmation of sale, after the investor has made its
purchase decision. Relying on the efficient markets hypothesis,
the Committee argues that once this information is in the SEC's
public file, institutional investors and others may freely examine
and assess it before making their purchase decisions.'
Although important to ensure that investors receive infor-
mation before they make their investment decisions, the Advi-
sory Committee's information-delivery reform is not tied to a
company registration system. For example, simply requiring that
the final prospectus be delivered before investors make their
purchase decisions accomplishes the same result under the cur-
rent system. While not lacking merit, the Committee's proposal
is separate from the company registration proposal.2 4
Fourth, the Advisory Committee's proposal reduces the scope
of affiliate resale restrictions. Under Section 2(11), all those
selling for "any person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect com-
mon control with the issuer" are considered underwriters.' Con-
trol persons under the current system, therefore, are ineligible
for Section 4(1)'s exemption from the registration requirements
of Section 5. Although somewhat ambiguous, the definition of
control person today extends to cover a wide range of parties able
to influence policy decisions at the issuer, including top executive
officers and major shareholders. 226 The Advisory Committee
'Advisory Committee Report at 23-27 (cited in note 13). The Advisory Committee de-
fines a de inimis equity offering as involving less than three percent of the public float
of the security in any period of three business days. Id at 24-25, 27. For nonconvertible
debt and de minimi equity offerings, the information could be disclosed either on a Form
8-K-and become part of the registration statement--or as a prospectus supplement. Id
at 25.
Id at 78.
'The Advisory Committee also argues that a company registration system saves is-
suers the legal, accounting, underwriting, printing, filing fees, and other direct adminis-
trative costs associated with conducting a public offering today. Id at 17. While true,
these costs would also be saved through an expansion of the current shelf registration
system. Indeed, as discussed above in the text, the main contribution of the Advisory
Committee toward achieving a company registration regime is to institute what is essen-
tially a perpetual shelf registration for registered companies. See text accompanying
notes 176-205.
'See Section 2(11), Securities Act, codified at 15 USC § 77b(11).
' Control is not defined explicitly in the Securities Act. Rule 405 of the Act, however,
does provide that control "means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
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would reduce the scope of affiliate registration to the CEO, inside
directors, those persons with 20 percent of the voting power, and
those with 10 percent of the voting power and at least one direc-
tor on the board."7 Regardless of the merits of reducing those
considered control persons under Section 2(11) for registration
purposes, the Advisory Committee's proposal on affiliates is un-
related to company registration, and could just as easily be em-
ployed under today's regime.
Finally, the Advisory Committee makes a number of recom-
mendations to enhance the value of the information disclosure
requirements.228 The Committee, for example, would compel two
members of a company's "top management" to certify to the SEC
that they reviewed the information contained in the company's
Form 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings and that they are unaware of
any misleading disclosures or omissions. 9 Furthermore, the
Committee recommends requiring management to prepare a re-
port to the board of directors' audit committee that would de-
scribe "the company's practices and procedures, if any, to ensure
the integrity of all periodic and current reports filed under the
Exchange Act."23° The Committee also proposes expanding the
scope of required Form 8-K filings to include material develop-
ments relating to the rights of security holders, the resignation
or removal of any of the top five executive officers, defaults of
senior securities, sales of significant percentages of the com-
pany's outstanding stock, or warnings from an independent audi-
tor that reliance on an audit report included in a previous filing
is no longer permissibleY Finally, the Committee would require
a risk factor analysis within each company's annual Form 10-K
filing.23
2
Although the merits of each of these disclosure-related re-
forms are debatable, many of them may in fact increase the value
of information disclosure to investors. As with many of the other
reforms contained in the Advisory Committee's report, however,
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." Rule 405, Securities Act, 17
CFR § 230.405 (1996). Some courts, furthermore, have held that control embodies the
ability to force the issuer and its officers and directors to provide the necessary signatures
for a valid registration statement. See Pennaluna & Co v SEC, 410 F2d 861, 865 (9th Cir
1969) (adopting "position to obtain" signatures test).
'See Advisory Committee Report at 98 (cited in note 13).
2Id at 29-31.
'Id at 30. Top management would include the chief executive officer, chief operating
officer, chief financial officer, or chief accounting officer. Id.
' Id at 106-07. This report would be made public as an exhibit in the company's an-
nual Form 10-K filing. Id at 106.
2' Id at 107-08.
'2Id at 108-09.
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the Advisory Committee's suggested disclosure reforms could
very well apply even under the current system to increase inves-
tor protection. Arguably, the increase in disclosure reforms and
clarification of gatekeeper antifraud duties are a necessary by-
product of company registration. Because company registration
may result in speedier offerings to the public, gatekeepers and
management may lack the time to adequately police an offering.
Additional legal requirements may therefore ensure that parties
close to the offering take care to ensure truthful and complete
disclosures. Note, however, that this problem exists today in the
shelf registration process and is not necessarily unique to the
formal company registration system.
3. What's missing from the proposal.
Stripped of its peripheral reforms, the Advisory Committee's
central addition to the company registration framework is to in-
troduce continuous shelf registration, reduce the prospectus de-
livery requirements, and deter issuers in most circumstances
from using a private placement or other exempt offering in place
of a public shelf offering. Although this certainly provides many
of the benefits envisioned by Milton Cohen in his 1966 article,
the Advisory Committee left several questions unanswered.
Most conspicuously, the Committee left ambiguous the abil-
ity of smaller, less followed companies to partake of the benefits
of a company registration system. Excluded from the pilot pro-
gram, small-size companies may eventually share in the com-
pany registration system with additional restrictions.' The Ad-
visory Committee Report notes that, at a minimum, privately
held companies must undergo the entire initial public offering
process before entering into the company registration system.'
Here, however, the arguments for company registration become
much weaker. Particularly with the smallest of companies, the
efficient market hypothesis may not hold true. Some smaller
OTC companies trade only once-if not less-per day."5 This lack
of liquidity, in turn, leads to less attention from institutional and
'The Advisory Committee did suggest that smaller companies may be able to take
advantage of the company registration system, so long as additional protections are put
into place. These additional protections could include traditional prospectus delivery,
greater advance notice of transaction-specific information before any offering to investors,
or possible SEC staff review of annual financial and other information before the offering.
Id at 28, 94.
'Id at 93 ("The Committee believed that the current process for initial public offer-
ings [ I generally works well in assisting a company in the transition from a private to a
public company.").
See Dunkin, Bus Week at 82 (cited in note 47).
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other sophisticated investors. Accordingly, the market price of
smaller companies' stock often may not reflect all publicly avail-
able information. At least for these companies, nonmarket
mechanisms may need to supply entirely the information that
potential investors need.
A company-based registration system may, therefore, find
value in paralleling the different registration requirements in
Forms S-1 through S-3.235 Where companies trade in an efficient
market-S-3 companies, for example-a company registration
system could rely heavily on the market to transmit information
on the company to all investors."' For such companies, simply
filing periodic information disclosures with the SEC may be
enough to ensure that all investors receive the necessary invest-
ment information; the prospectus delivery requirement could ac-
cordingly be eliminated altogether. At the other extreme, S-1
companies may not trade in an efficient market or may not trade
in any pre-existing market whatsoever. For such companies, un-
til a company registration statement is filed, prohibiting all
trades except among close affiliates of the company or sophisti-
cated investors may make sense. Even after a company registra-
tion statement is filed, concern over the efficiency of the market
may require that a complete prospectus containing both general
and transactional company-related information be sent to each
prospective investor. S-2 companies, finally, may be treated
somewhere in between these two extremes. S-2 companies may
be allowed to issue securities off the company registration state-
ment (under a continuous shelf registration), but under the con-
dition that some amount of company-related information be in-
cluded in the prospectus delivered to investors.
Rather than focus on the issue of nonpilot companies, the
Advisory Committee's proposal instead reintroduces aspects of a
transaction-based system, basing the information- and prospec-
tus-delivery requirements on the size and type of offering trans-
action. 8 The Advisory Committee mistakenly focuses on these
'See text accompanying notes 48-53 (describing the SEC's Form S-1, S-2, and S-3 di-
vision of companies for registration purposes).
Interestingly, the Advisory Committee chose not to make all S-3 companies part of
the pilot program. Advisory Committee Report at 94-95 (cited in note 13) ("[It often takes
at least two years following an IPO for a company and its management to become fully
comfortable with the disclosure obligations of a public company and to have all their
mechanisms for gathering and disseminating information in place and properly func-
tioning."). This statement, however, calls into question why S-3 companies are currently
allowed to incorporate by reference as much as they do. If two years truly is necessary to
ensure an efficient market, S-3 companies should also be required to fulfill this two-year
requirement.
See text accompanying notes 182-97.
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transactional differences rather than on overall differences at the
company level. Although two pilot companies may differ in the
size of their equity offering, it is unclear why the amount of dis-
closure, the extent of antifraud liability, and prospectus delivery
should also differ in a similar manner. The Advisory Committee
argues that both nonroutine and extraordinary categories of
transactions "because of their size, are likely to alter substan-
tially the information previously provided to the market and to
involve significant oral and written selling efforts.""'9 Companies
that engage in nonroutine or extraordinary transactions, how-
ever, will also attract increased attention from securities indus-
try professionals precisely because of the transaction's size. If the
issuer's securities trade in an efficient market, this attention will
ensure that information is disseminated both quickly and widely
into the secondary market. For pilot companies engaged in non-
routine or extraordinary transactions, the efficient market hy-
pothesis thus argues for fewer prospectus delivery requirements
rather than the increased amount in the Advisory Committee's
proposal. So long as information on the transaction is filed in
some form with the SEC, the information will be absorbed into
the market.
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., a member of the Advisory
Committee, has independently argued that disclosure should be
aimed at individual investors "to the extent that investor atti-
tudes toward risk are necessarily subjective."24 Coffee contends
that the market values securities on a risk-neutral basis; as a re-
sult, risk-averse investors may want information other than the
market price to determine the suitability of particular securities
for their own taste for risk.24 Although investors may have an
idea of a company's risk from past disclosures-including the an-
nual report-nonroutine or extraordinary transactions may sig-
nificantly alter the risk level of the company. 2 To the extent Cof-
fee is correct, disclosure directly to individual investors in cases
of nonroutine or extraordinary issuer transactions may be neces-
sary.
Coffee, however, misses two crucial points. First, investors
who are risk-averse gain more than risk-neutral investors from
reducing risk. Risk-averse investors, more than any other type of
investor, will value the diversification of unsystematic risk pro-
vided by mutual funds and other institutional investors. Because
'Advisory Committee Report at 85 (cited in note 13).
'Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1167 (cited in note 11).
" See id.
2id.
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most risk-averse investors will flock to the institutional inves-
tors, the danger of small, individual investors mispricing indi-
vidual securities based on their own risk preferences is mini-
mized. Second, for those few risk-averse individual investors re-
maining in the general securities markets, the growth of the In-
ternet and other electronic media has greatly reduced the cost for
such investors when gathering information on extraordinary
transactions.' Particularly for S-3 companies, the many ana-
lysts that follow such companies will undoubtedly report news of
an extraordinary transaction to other investors and to the news
media. The number of individual investors that truly benefit
from direct delivery of prospectus information is accordingly
small. Furthermore, it is unclear why the rest of the capital mar-
ket must pay-through higher issue costs and greater uncer-
tainty and delay-to subsidize the research efforts of these few
investors.
Finally, the Advisory Committee's Report also drastically re-
duces the importance and role of private placements and other
exemptions from Section 5's registration requirements. On the
one hand, the diminished role of private placements makes
sense. If the company itself and all of its associated securities are
registered, exemptions from the registration requirements no
longer are required. For several reasons developed in Section H
below, however, it is unclear if society benefits from the complete
elimination of private placements and the current restricted se-
curity system. The Committee does allow pilot companies in the
full company registration system to make nonconvertible debt
private placements and limited placement offerings. Moreover,
pilot companies in the modified company registration system
may engage in the full range of exempt offerings under Section 5.
Although providing some possibility for exempt offerings, the
Committee needs to consider more flexible measures designed to
allow exempt transactions where both issuers and investors
benefit from opting out of the company registration system. For
example, the Advisory Committee recognizes that an issuer may
wish to reveal confidential information only to a few select inves-
tors but not to the market as a whole. Allowing such transactions
gives companies an incentive ex ante to invest in projects re-
quiring confidentiality, bolstering both innovation and competi-
tion.' Conversely, pressures that may distort the choice to do a
'For example, investors may now access detailed company-specific financial infor-
mation and up-to-date financial indices on the Internet through www.wsj.com and
www.marketedge.com among several other Internet content providers.
'"The ability to maintain the confidentiality of business plans or other business-
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private placement-including differential antifraud liability-
should be eliminated to ensure that issuers conduct an exempt
offering only where society as a whole benefits. As Part III dis-
cusses, a status-based antifraud regime combined with today's
private placement exemption from Section 5 accomplishes this
goal.
C. Impact of Company Registration
The Advisory Committee's company registration suffers from
one further fundamental flaw: although formally the Securities
Act's transaction focus presents several problems, many of the
SEC's reforms in the 1980s brought securities practice substan-
tively closer to a company registration system. Although the Ad-
visory Committee's continuous shelf proposal does complete the
transformation of the Securities Act toward a formal status-
based registration regime, the benefit from this transformation is
not as great as it would have been at the time of Milton Cohen's
1966 article. Furthermore, the uncertainty costs of introducing a
new registration system, as well as potential costs due to the
specter of increased frivolous litigation under the Advisory
Committee's proposed expansion of antifraud liability, may out-
weigh this benefit. This Section details the shifts in the current
regime over the past two decades that have already introduced
many of the substantive aspects of company registration into the
current system.
The differences between the transaction- and status-based
regimes embodied within the Securities Act and Exchange Act
may be divided into four major areas. First, information disclo-
sure under a company registration system occurs periodically
and whenever certain material events occur with respect to the
company. Exchange Act reporting companies, for instance, must
file with the SEC all material developments relating to changes
in control, the purchase or sale of significant assets, changes in
accountants, and bankruptcy on both Form 8-K and their peri-
odic filings.2" Under the transaction-based Securities Act, how-
ever, information disclosure occurs only when a securities trans-
related information is important for at least two reasons. First, from an ex ante perspec-
tive, companies may be deterred from making innovative investments to the extent they
realize that the securities laws will force them to reveal the innovation to other compa-
nies that then may simply "free ride" off the innovation ex post. Second, companies plan-
ning to engage in more vigorous competition with their rivals may also be deterred to the
extent the securities laws force them to reveal their plans prematurely to the market and
thereby to their competitors.
'See Form 8-K, Exchange Act, 5 Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) SS 31,001-04 (Jan 30, 1995).
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action occurs. Thus, where a company does not qualify as an Ex-
change Act reporting company but nevertheless has some class of
securities publicly traded, the company may avoid information
disclosures even where the information is highly relevant to
present investors.2"
Second, prior to the delivery of the statutory prospectus in
the post-effective period, the transaction-based approach of the
Securities Act strictly controls most forms of communication re-
lating to the offering. Although oral communications may com-
mence after the registration statement is initially filed with the
SEC, additional "free writing" written materials are forbidden
unless preceded by or accompanied with a final statutory pro-
spectus after the registration statement has become effective.
Because the Securities Act focuses on one particular transac-
tion-the public offering of securities-it places great importance
on ensuring that investors in the public offering transaction are
given the required statutory prospectus information first, before
other potentially more misleading information is received and lit-
tle importance on the needs of investors generally in the com-
pany for free information disclosure. In contrast, the Exchange
Act focuses on simply ensuring that an adequate amount of in-
formation for Exchange Act reporting companies exists in the
market generally without any restrictions on other information
disclosure.
Third, information in a company-based regime is distributed
to the market as a whole. Several mechanisms exist to dissemi-
nate information to the market; for companies in an efficient
market, simply filing the information with the SEC may be suffi-
cient to disperse information quickly into the marketplace. Fur-
thermore, because the market already incorporates information
from prior filings, investors in an efficient market require only
new information. The Securities Act, in contrast, emphasizes the
distribution of information directly to potential investors. Trans-
action-based regimes place little reliance on the ability of indi-
vidual investors to ferret out information from publicly available
sources. Direct disclosure ensures that investors actually receive
investment-related information.' Moreover, to provide isolated
'Rule 15c2-11 of the Exchange Act, however, prohibits broker-dealers from publish-
ing quotations in over-the-counter "pink sheet" markets without obtaining specified in-
formation on the company, including basic financial data. See Rule 15c2-11, Exchange
Act, 17 CFR § 240.15c2-11 (1996).
'" Of course, whether simply receiving investment information from the issuer alone
provides investors with any guidance is debatable. Investors must look to other sources of
information on the economy, the issuer's industry, and the issuer's competitors, and syn-
thesize this with the company-specific information from the issuer to determine the value
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investors with full information, this disclosure must include not
only new and current information, but also background and past
information on the company.
The final difference between the status- and transaction-
based approaches concerns the resale aftermarket. The transac-
tion-based approach leads to disparate aftermarket treatment of
securities of the same company and even of the same class.
Shares of common stock issued through a public offering, for ex-
ample, enjoy different liquidity than shares of the same class of
common purchased in a private placement. For example, inves-
tors may not trade IBM common shares sold through a private
placement until the Rule 144 holding period expires; identical
IBM common shares sold through a public offering, however,
may be freely traded. A company registration system would for-
mally eliminate such distinctions, providing for equal treatment
of all securities of the same class of a company.
These differences, however, are today more formal than real.
Although embodying two separate approaches to regulation, the
Securities Act and Exchange Act have both moved in substance
much closer to a purely status-based approach over the past
twenty years. Several major changes account for this shift, in-
cluding: the integrated disclosure system; incorporation by refer-
ence; shelf registration; and the Qualified Institutional Buyer
("QIB") market. Each is discussed below in turn.
In 1982, the SEC adopted the current integrated disclosure
system.' Realizing that investors require the same information
in making a decision to purchase securities-whether in an of-
fering from the company or in the secondary market-the SEC
established a core set of common information items within
Regulations S-K and S-X, which the various forms within the Se-
curities Act and Exchange Act reference. 9 For example, Item
303 of Regulation S-K sets forth the requirements for the Man-
agement Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
sults of Operation disclosure.2 9 Both Form S-1 of the Securities
Act and Form 10-K of the Exchange Act include Item 303 in their
filing provisions.2
of an investment in the issuer. Most individual investors, however, lack the financial
ability, time, and resources to conduct such an analysis.
'See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No 6383, 47
Fed Reg 11,380 (Mar 16, 1982).
'Regulation S-K, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 229 (1996); Regulation S-X, Securities Act,
17 CFR § 210 (1996).
See Item 303, Regulation S-K, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 229.303 (1996).
=' See Form S-1 (cited in note 16); Form 10-K, Item 7, Exchange Act, 5 Fed Sec L Rptr
(CCH) 131,104 (Jan 30, 1995).
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That same year, the SEC also provided that certain Securi-
ties Act registration filings could incorporate by reference some
of their required information disclosure from parallel sections in
the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure documents, depending on
whether the issuer qualified for Form S-I, S-2, or S-3." The ad-
vent of integrated disclosure, combined with incorporation by
reference, dramatically reduced the cost of putting together of-
fering documents for S-2 and S-3 companiesY Because many of
the individual disclosure items in the registration documents and
the Exchange Act documents refer to identical Regulation S-K or
S-X items, incorporation by reference does not result in any dif-
ferent type of disclosure.' This both reduces the cost of putting
together a registration filing and accelerates the speed of con-
ducting a public offering. Furthermore, if issuers who take ad-
vantage of incorporation by reference are well capitalized and
followed by many analysts, the information contained in all dis-
closure documents will be reflected in the market price of the
company. 5 At the extreme, where all information in the regis-
tration document is incorporated by reference from Exchange Act
documents-as under the Advisory Committee's proposal-no
additional work is necessary to put together a registration docu-
ment. The greater the incorporation by reference, therefore, the
closer the current system moves in substance toward a company
registration system." 8
In 1983, the SEC also modified Rule 415,' providing for
shelf registration for issuers qualifying for Form S-3 registra-
'
2 See Securities Act Release No 6383 (cited in note 248).
'See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1159 (cited in note 11) ("Shelf registration and
incorporation by reference really implied that disclosure to the market through '34 filings
replaced disclosure to individual investors through prospectuses.").
'Note, however, that where different antifraud liability applies to Form S-2 or S-3
than to Form 10-K and the other Exchange Act documents, the quality of disclosure may
differ for identical information line items. See note 213 (citing evidence that incorporation
by reference may reduce the quality of Securities Act filings).
'See Michael W. Prozan and Michael T. Fatale, Revisiting "Truth in Securities". The
Use of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 20 Hofstra L Rev 687, 697-703 (1992)
(describing the efficient market hypothesis's influence on the SEC's formulation of Forms
S-1, S-2 and S-3). Prozan and Fatale note that increased technological advances in the
communication of information will lead more companies' securities to trade in an efficient
market, thereby putting pressure on the three-tier Form S-I, S-2, and S-3 qualifications
to expand incorporation by reference in the future. Id at 702-03.
Of course, under the current system, issuers must follow the gun-jumping rules and
prospectus delivery requirements, even with incorporation by reference. Nevertheless,
the more information incorporated by reference, the less time the issuer must spend in
the gun-jumping phase of the registration process. In the limit, registration with com-
plete incorporation by reference may take place almost instantaneously after the issuer
decides to issue securities.
='See Shelf Registration, SEC Securities Act Release No 6499, [1983-84 Transfer
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tion." Where incorporation by reference reduces the cost and
delay of the registration process, shelf registration allows issuers
to incur these costs once and then issue a variable amount of se-
curities reasonably expected to be sold within two years following
the initial registration. 9 S-3 issuers that take advantage of Rule
415 when issuing equity also must either make a fixed price of-
fering or comply with the rule's volume limitations.2" Neverthe-
less, during the two-year time period, S-3 issuers do not have to
contend with Section 5's gun-jumping rules because the securi-
ties under shelf registration are already registered.26'
The availability of shelf registration almost completely
moved the Securities Act regime toward the company registra-
tion model in substance.262 Companies using shelf registration to-
Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 83,449 (Nov 17, 1983); Delayed or Continuous Offering
and Sale of Securities, SEC Securities Act Release No 6423, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed
Sec L Rptr (CCH) 9 83,250 (Sept 2, 1982).
See Rule 415(aXlXx), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.415(aXlXx) (1996) (making Rule
415 available for securities registered on Form S-3). Rule 415 also applies to securities
sold on behalf of those other than the registrant, securities sold pursuant to an employee
benefit plan of the registrant, securities to be issued upon the exercise of outstanding
warrants or options, and securities to be issued in connection with a business combina-
tion, among other transactions. See Rule 415(aX1Xi)-(ix), Securities Act, 17 CFR
§ 230.415(aX1Xi)-(ix) (1996). See also Bloomenthal and Holme, Roberts & Owen, Securi-
ties Law Handbck § 5.12 (cited in note 27) (describing the requirements of Rule 415 shelf
offerings). Since 1992, issuers under Rule 415 have been able to make a "universal" shelf
registration, registering an aggregate dollar amount of securities without delineating the
exact amount of any particular class of securities for registration. See Simplification of
Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, SEC Securities Act Release No
6943, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) 9185,015 (July 16, 1992).
'Rule 415(aX2) provides that securities eligible for shelf registration under Rule
415(aXlXx), among others, "may only be registered in an amount which, at the time the
registration statement becomes effective, is reasonably expected to be offered and sold
within two years from the initial effective date of the registration.' Rule 415(aX2), Securi-
ties Act, 17 CFR § 230.415(aX2) (1996).
'See Rule 415(aX4Xii), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.415(aX4Xii) (1996) ("[W]here
voting stock is registered, the amount of securities registered for such purposes must not
exceed 10 percent of the aggregate market value of the registrants outstanding voting
stock held by non-affiliates of the registrant.. . ."). For S-3 issuers offering equity securi-
ties not at a fixed price, the securities must be sold through underwriters and the under-
writers must be named in the prospectus that is part of the registration statement. See
Rule 415(aX4Xiii)-(iv), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.415(aX4Xiii)-(iv) (1996).
"' See SEC Securities Act Release No 6499 (1983) (cited in note 257X"The Rule en-
ables a registrant to time its offering to avail itself of the most advantageous market con-
ditions.").
'From January 1994 to December 1995, S-3 issuers registered $284.1 million of
common stock through a shelf offering while only registering $111.1 million of common
through a non-shelf offering. See Advisory Committee Report at 48 (Appendix A) (cited in
note 13). See also Margaret A. Bancroft, Responding to Gustafson: Company Registration
and a New Negligence Standard, Insights 14, 15 (July 1995) ("Company registration car-
ries the integrated disclosure concept to both its intellectual and practical conclusion.').
At the time of the implementation of shelf registration, several scholars commented
on its desirability. See Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and
The University of Chicago Law Review
gether with incorporation by reference in an S-3 registration
statement may avail themselves of a two-year period in which
they may issue securities into the market without any delay and
with only a minimal amount of additional information disclo-
sures. The reduced cost of conducting a public offering under
Rule 415 also lowers the incentive of issuers to conduct an ex-
empt transaction. In the extreme, where issuers are able to con-
duct all offerings through shelf registration without any extra
cost or delay, issuers will choose to register almost all their secu-
rities and thereby bypass the complex resale provisions of the Se-
curities Act.
The Advisory Committee, nevertheless, argues that the cur-
rent shelf registration process is inadequate for a couple of rea-
sons. Initially, it contends that issuers may avoid the current
shelf registration process due to the fear of "market overhang,"
whereby the stock price of the issuer drops due to the announce-
ment of a plan to issue additional common stock.263 The an-
nouncement of a specific amount of securities to be sold over a
two year period, the Advisory Committee argues, may engender
such a market overhang effect.2" Two responses, however, are
possible to the Advisory Committee's arguments. First, to the ex-
tent a market overhang effect truly is present, the company reg-
istration proposal will exacerbate such an effect by essentially
placing an infinite amount of securities on the shelf. Second, if a
market overhang effect exists, it most likely is due to the signal
sent by issuers about the motivation behind their offering of se-
curities-for example, because the market price is overvalued-
rather than due to anything inherent in increasing the market
capitalization of the company. To the extent such a signal exists
and impacts the stock price, it is unclear why the magnitude of
the signal is different under either the shelf or company registra-
tion approaches. Within both systems, the issuer must at some
point before the actual sale of securities indicate to the market
its desire to conduct such an offering, generating a clear signal to
the market. Although the issuer must signal at an earlier time
Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 Va L Rev 135 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf
Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analy-
sis, 70 Va L Rev 1005 (1984).
'See Advisory Committee Report at 51-54 (Appendix A) (cited in note 13). Citing
data from Advisory Committee member Dr. George Hatsopoulos, the Committee noted
that the market overhang effect is greatest for smaller issuers and lower for larger com-
panies, including in particular the pilot companies. See id.
'See id at 53-54 (Appendix A) ('[Tihe continuing need to specify an aggregate dollar
amount of securities to be offered apparently has perpetuated market overhang con-
cerns.-).
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under the shelf registration process, this signal is necessarily
diluted by the probability that the securities may never be sold
off the shelf, whereas the signal of an offering in a company reg-
istration setting will result in a larger price drop because the
probability of securities being sold is much higher."8 5 Moreover,
at the actual offering, regardless of the timing of the signals, to
the extent the signals for both shelf and company registration of-
ferings indicate that the managers feel the securities are over-
priced, the signals will result in the same price drop in the secu-
rities.2"
The Advisory Committee also points out that Rule 415 only
allows issuers to register the amount of securities they reason-
ably expect to offer in a two-year period. This may result in two
disadvantages to issuers. First, issuers unable to plan for the
amount of securities they wish to sell may underestimate this
amount and thereby lack the same amount of flexibility as issu-
ers under the company registration system. However, although
issuers are limited to registering only the amount of securities
they "reasonably expect" to sell in two years, in practice courts
and the SEC may have difficulty second-guessing the business
plans of issuers. Furthermore, to the extent an issuer does face a
sudden and dramatically greater need to raise securities not cov-
ered under a shelf registration, the issuer can simply register
these securities separately using Form S-3, incorporating by ref-
erence much of the required information.267 The second disadvan-
tage to issuers is that they must re-register the securities every
two years to maintain their shelf offering. Again, however, the
'Of course, once the issuer decides to takedown securities from the shelf, an addi-
tional signal will be sent to the market. The combination of this takedown signal with the
earlier signal from the initiation of the shelf offering should equal the magnitude of the
one signal generated by the company registration notice of an offering.
'The Advisory Committee also argues that short-sellers may become more active
when the potential supply of securities is increased because their risk of a squeeze is re-
duced. See Advisory Committee Report at 53 (Appendix A) (cited in note 13). However, for
companies followed by many analysts and institutional investors, the ability of short-
sellers to move the price of securities away from their fundamental value is suspect.
Moreover, the potential increased supply of securities is even greater under the company
registration system that essentially places an infinite amount of securities on the shelf.
'Most takedowns from the shelf occur within sixty days of the initial filing of the
Form S-3 registration statement. See id at 54 (Appendix A). This provides evidence that
issuers do not value the ability to avoid filing a subsequent Form S-3 registration state-
ment. Furthermore, although some argue that issuers value the flexibility company regis-
tration grants in being able to time the market and issuer securities quickly when market
conditions dictate, the actual small usage of shelf takedowns past sixty days from the ini-
tial Form S-3 filings runs counter to this argument. If issuers truly did value the flexibil-
ity of offering securities in coordination with market conditions, one would expect to see
more shelf takedowns later in the life of a shelf registration.
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magnitude of this additional burden is unclear given the ability
of issuers to incorporate-by-reference under Form S-3. Moreover,
simply reducing SEC review of Form S-3 companies alone will
reduce the delay on shelf-offerings.26
Then, in 1990, recognizing the growing role of institutional
investors in the capital markets and in order to combat the
growing trend of such investors foregoing the United States in
favor of other countries with more lax securities regulation, the
SEC instituted Rule 144A to provide for a liquid market solely
for QIBsY9 To qualify for Rule 144A, institutional investors must
meet QIB requirements setting minimum investment thresh-
olds."' Under Rule 144A, restricted securities may be sold freely
to QIBs without regard to any resale limitation or information
requirement.27' The securities sold through Rule 144A, however,
may not consist of the same class of any security of the issuer
'The Committee also points out that Rule 415 places several additional limitations
on "at-the-market" offerings of equity securities. Id. See Rule 415(aX4), Securities Act, 17
CFR § 230.415(aX4) (1996). Here, the Committee's point is valid in that the current shelf
registration system may be inferior to the company registration proposal. Again, how-
ever, it is unclear why this particular disadvantage of shelf registration cannot simply be
handled through reform to Rule 415 directly. If it is true that the limits on at-the-market
equity offerings are an unnecessary burden, why not simply repeal these limits directly?
Additionally, the Committee notes that the filing fee for shelf registration is non-
refundable and payable at the time of registration rather than at the takedown of securi-
ties from the shelf as would be the case under company registration's "pay-as-you-go" sys-
tem. However, switching to a pay-as-you-go system could be accomplished fairly easily
under the current shelf registration process. Moreover, especially for pilot companies
conducting a relatively large offering, it is unclear how the manner or timing of SEC fil-
ing fees that constitute only a minuscule fraction of the offering transaction costs affect
the public offering process. For Form S-3 shelf registrations from 1993-95, the combined
total of registration fees, legal fees, accounting fees, state registration fees, and printing
costs amounted to only 0.4 percent of the offering amount. See Advisory Committee Re-
port at 46 (Appendix A) (cited in note 13).
'Rule 144A, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A (1996). See also Bloomenthal and
Holme, Roberts & Owen, Securities Law Handbook § 11.01 (cited in note 27) (describing
Rule 144A and the PORTAL market). The scope of Rule 144A resales has grown dramati-
cally. From eight placements totaling $916 million in 1990, the use of Rule 144A grew to
243 placements totaling $44.672 billion in 1993. Staff Report on Rule 144A, [1994-95 De-
cisions] Fed Sec L Rptr (CCH) S 85,428 (Aug 18, 1994).
'A Qualified Institutional Buyer is defined in Rule 144A(aX) as an institutional en-
tity that "in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million
in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity ... ." Rule 144A(aXl)(i), Se-
curities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(aXlXi) (1996). Dealers registered pursuant to Section 15
of the Exchange Act must meet only a $10 million requirement. Rule 144A(aXl)(ii), Secu-
rities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(aXlXii) (1996).
" See Rule 144A(b), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(b) (1996). Sellers must ensure
that the purchaser in fact is a QIB (or is reasonably believed to be a QIB). Rule
144A(dXl), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(dXl) (1996). Furthermore, the seller must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the purchaser is aware that the seller is relying on
an exemption from Section 5s registration requirements. Rule 144A(dX2), Securities Act,
17 CFR § 230.144A(dX2) (1996).
Status-Based Antifraud Liability
listed on a U.S. securities exchange or traded on an automated
U.S. interdealer quotation system, such as NASDAQ.2 72 Fur-
thermore, for the securities of non-Exchange Act reporting issu-
ers, the purchaser has the right to demand certain specified in-
formation at its discretion.273
Rule 144A provides a means for at least some investors-the
QIBs-to trade restricted securities. Furthermore, issuers may
use Regulation D to sell securities to QIBs directly, and thereby
initiate Rule 144A trading.2 The combination of Regulation D
and Rule 144A results in a special trading market for restricted
securities without any mandatory information disclosure on the
issuer's part and no holding period requirement.275 Because spe-
cial information requirements exist for non-Exchange Act re-
porting companies, however, QIB markets are more likely to
arise for companies that make Exchange Act filings. Recall that
one of the major differences between the company registration
model and the current system is that the trading status of a
company's securities under company registration depends not on
the particular path by which each individual security entered the
market but rather on the capitalization and quality of the un-
derlying company. The QIB market established under Rule 144A,
therefore, blurs the distinction between the transaction-based
'See Rule 144A(dX3), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(dX3) (1996). Whether a se-
curity meets this fungibility criterion is determined as of the date when the Rule 144A
securities were initially issued. Id.
'Rule 144A(dX4), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A(dX4) (1996).
'See Rule 144A, Prelim Note 7, 17 CFR § 230.144A (1996) (providing that purchas-
ers in a Regulation D offering may acquire the securities with a view to reselling the se-
curities under Rule 144A without affecting the initial Regulation D exemption). Issuers
themselves may not use Rule 144A because Rule 144A simply protects the issuers from
being labeled as underwriters under Section 2(11). Because Section 4(1), however, re-
quires that the transaction involve no issuer, underwriter, or dealer, issuers must still
satisfy Section 5's registration requirements unless they find another exemption, such as
Rule 506 of Regulation D. Rule 506, Regulation D, 17 CFR § 230.506 (1996).
'Through NASDAQ's "PORTAL Market," QIBs may now easily trade in restricted
securities, significantly reducing the liquidity penalty of such securities. See Self-
Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to a Security Application Fee for The PORTAL
Market, Exchange Act Release No 34,562, 59 Fed Reg 44,210 (Aug 19, 1994).
The rationale behind resale restrictions and the resale exemptions in Rule 144 and
Rule 144A turns on the transaction focus of the Securities Act. The resale limitation is
necessary to prevent issuers from avoiding the volume, number of investors, and manner
of sale limitations imposed under the various transaction exemptions to Section 5. If the
investor's resale is in reality part of the issuer's initial transaction-where, for example,
the investor acts as a Section 2(11) underwriter for the issuer-then resales to those out-
side the scope of the initial transaction exemption must be restricted to maintain the ex-
emption's limitations. Suppose Acme, Inc. sells bonds through an intrastate offering un-
der Section 3(aXll). If investors were able to resell the securities immediately to out-of-
state investors, issuers would easily be able to undo the intrastate limitations.
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Securities Act regime and company registration, creating a liquid
market for even restricted securities of Exchange Act reporting
companies.
Finally, the SEC's EDGAR system of electronic filing com-
bined with the growth of easy access avenues to EDGAR through
the Internet has reduced the difference between the means of in-
formation dissemination used in the Securities Act and Exchange
Act. Where even as recently as a few years ago, investors had to
locate Exchange Act filings physically at the SEC or rely on a
commercial intermediary to locate those filings, investors may
now simply turn to several different Internet web sites to access
filings for a particular company.76 As well, investors may use
these same Internet sites to access filings and prospectuses for
companies undergoing a public offering transaction pursuant to
the Securities Act. For both the Securities Act and Exchange Act
information disclosure provisions, the introduction of new inex-
pensive and quick means of information dissemination reduces
the importance of the formal differences in the approaches the
two Acts take to distributing information.
In summary, the Securities Act and Exchange Act are not as
far apart in practice as their different transaction- and status-
based frameworks would suggest. The introduction of integrated
disclosure, incorporation by reference, shelf registration, Rule
144A trading, and the EDGAR filing system substantially
brought elements of company registration into the Securities Act.
Information disclosure under Form S-3 and shelf registration
now occur largely through periodic disclosure and incorporation
by reference, as in a status-based regime. Although information
during an offering is still distributed primarily to the transacting
parties, 77 the bulk of the actual disclosure occurs through the pe-
riodic SEC filings if this information is incorporated by reference
from Exchange Act documents. Investors, moreover, may find
most Securities Act and Exchange Act information on the Inter-
net through the EDGAR system. The availability of shelf regis-
tration further reduces the burden on issuers of meeting the
transaction-specific requirements of an offering and thereby re-
duces the importance of the exemptions to Section 5. Finally, al-
though some restricted securities are still issued in the current
system, the QIB market has reduced the importance of the li-
quidity penalty which many shares of restricted securities expe-
"For instance, investors may look to the SEC's own site at www.sec.gov or to a com-
mercial provider such as at www.disclosure.com.
'See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1159 (cited in note 11) (listing the prospectus
delivery requirement as one obstacle to administrative integration of the securities laws).
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rience. It therefore remains an empirical question whether the
remaining differences-involving the prospectus delivery re-
quirements, limits on shelf registration, and treatment of re-
stricted securities-amount to much practical difference.
Moreover, the Advisory Committee Report calls for company
registration only where it is most warranted: for the pilot com-
panies. Given the ability of pilot companies to engage in shelf
registrations within the current regime, however, the marginal
benefits of extending the shelf registration time period are un-
clear. Indeed, Coffee and two fellow Advisory Committee mem-
bers-Edward F. Greene and Lawrence W. Sonsini--expressed
doubt that companies will view the benefit of continuous shelf
registration as enough to induce them to voluntarily elect into
the company registration pilot program. 8 Outside the pilot com-
panies, real questions remain as to the scope of company regis-
tration. In some cases, where companies do not trade in an effi-
cient market, retaining some aspectd of the transaction-based
system may further investor welfare. A whole-hearted formal
transition to a company registration system, therefore, may not
be warranted for the entire market. To the extent that only S-3
companies deserve company registration treatment, a less radi-
cal reform-such as instituting a broader shelf registration sys-
tem-may accomplish the same substantive goals as company
registration without the accompanying administrative change for
non-S-3 companies. Furthermore, reform should leave open the
possibility of private placements for S-3 companies at their own
discretion. As the next Part discusses, providing a private place-
ment option improves social welfare, even in a company registra-
tion system. Finally, although the Advisory Committee did con-
cern itself with some aspects of the Securities Act's liability pro-
visions,"' it missed the area where reform would provide the
most benefit: status-based antifraud liability. As this Article dis-
cusses below, shifting toward a more status-based antifraud re-
gime will move the current Securities Act framework even closer
to the substantive ideal of company registration. Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, status-based antifraud liability also
'See Advisory Committee Report at 40-41 (cited in note 13) (separate statement of
John C. Coffee Jr., Edward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini) (commenting on "how
weak the incentives may be to elect into a voluntary company-registration system, espe-
cially in light of the growing use of unallocated shelf registration statements").
The Advisory Committee did consider a number of different antifraud schemes to go
along with company registration. Id at 110-11. Although these proposals advocated vary-
ing antifraud liability by type of transaction or investor involved, none of them advocated
introducing a status-based determination of how to apply antifraud liability.
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
provides more effective deterrence against fraud while conserv-
ing scarce enforcement resources.
III. COMPANY REGISTRATION AND ANTIFRAUD LIABILITY
Given the array of reforms in the 1980s that introduced most
of the substantive aspects of company registration into the secu-
rities laws, the greatest source of remaining complexity and ten-
sion between the transaction- and status-based approaches lies
in the availability of exempt nonpublic offerings. For example,
the use of private placements requires that securities of the same
issuer be tracked separately and treated differently depending on
the path they take to market. This is true even for securities of
the same class. One easy way to eliminate this last vestige of
transaction-based regulation would be to do away with private
placements and other transaction exemptions to Section 5's reg-
istration requirements. The Advisory Committee failed to rec-
ommend such a radical reform, and for good reason. Private
placements serve a valuable social function, allowing issuers to
raise capital for information-sensitive projects that otherwise
would go unfunded, benefiting the issuers, investors, and society.
Recognizing this, the Advisory Committee put forth a new
"limited" exemption under the full company registration pilot and
would allow all current transaction exemptions to continue under
the modified pilot program.28 This Part discusses (a) the benefit
of retaining some sort of transaction exemption and (b) how
shifting to status-based antifraud liability retains these benefits
while reducing the substantive magnitude of the complexity and
tension in the current system's dual transaction- and status-
based approaches.
A. Preserving the Private Placement
In choosing between conducting a private placement or a
public offering, companies weigh several factors, including the
required information disclosure and the level of antifraud liabil-
ity."5 Private placements force issuers and investors to endure
Coffee argues that shortening the holding period for restricted securities in Rule.
144 and expanding the scope of the QIB market to include listed securities would greatly
increase the ability of issuers to raise capital quickly and inexpensively. See Coffee, 52
Wash & Lee L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 11) ("[lilt is not self-evident that company-
registration will produce greater gains than those that might result from liberalizing the
private placement exemption.").
"In the United States, private placements went from $16 billion in 1980 to $170.7
billion in 1989. This represented a jump from 22 percent of all corporate financing to 35.5
percent. See Kenneth F. Oettle, Publicly Traded Securities Are A Waiver Prerequisite, 135
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one substantial cost: the shares sold through a private placement
are typically restricted and therefore lack liquidity.2 In contrast,
private placements allow companies to reduce the level of their
antifraud liability exposure and cost of disclosure.
The Advisory Committee's proposed full company registra-
tion system would eliminate almost all forms of exempt transac-
tions under Section 5, including private placements. Eliminating
private placements would greatly simplify a number of transac-
tions under the Securities Act. Under the current system, securi-
ties issued through a private placement are restricted and sub-
ject to resale limitations typically for two years after the place-
ment." Because Section 5 of the Securities Act governs all
transactions, subsequent resellers of the security must find their
own exemption from Section 5. Resellers typically use Rule 144's
exemption; some larger institutions may engage in resales sooner
than two years after the placement through Rule 144A.2" The
full company registration system eliminates the need for these
complex resale limitations. No longer would investors, issuers,
and their attorneys need to trace the history of each individual
security they sold; rather, they would only need to focus on the
type of security and information general to the entire issuer's
valuation.
The benefits derived from eliminating private placements,
however, are overstated. First, many companies may already ap-
proximate many of the benefits afforded by a private placement
through a public offering, thereby reducing the number of issuers
voluntarily selecting to conduct a private placement and the vol-
ume of restricted securities. Through shelf registrations, for ex-
ample, large companies may already approximate the speed of
private placements through a normal public offering. Further-
NJ L J 919, 941 (1993) (citing figures published by IDD Information Services). See also
Mark Carey, et al, The Economics of Private Placements: A New Look, 2 Fin Markets, In-
stitutions & Instruments 1, 23 (Aug 1993) (noting that life insurance companies owned
82.6 percent of the private placement market from 1990-92 and that pension funds, fi-
nance companies, mutual funds, insurance companies, commercial banks, and investment
banks owned the remainder).
Stanley Keller has noted that many companies today conduct a private placement-
public offering hybrid consisting of a traditional private placement followed immediately
with shelf registration to allow purchasers to resell their securities. See Stanley Keller,
Basic Securities Act Concepts Revisited, Insights 5, 7 (May 1995) (noting that through
"private investment, public equity" or "PIPE" transactions, issuers can enjoy many of the
benefits of both private placements and public offerings).
'See Rule 502(d), Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.502(d) (1996) (providing that securi-
ties acquired in a transaction under Regulation D, except under Rule 504(bX1), cannot be
resold without registration or an exemption from registration).
'See Rule 144, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144 (1996).
'See Rule 144A, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.144A (1996).
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more, under a status-based antifraud regime, the use of one form
of offering over another would no longer provide an antifraud li-
ability advantage. Accordingly, many offerings which today are
conducted through private placements would, under a status-
based antifraud regime, voluntarily be shifted toward a public of-
fering. Once issued through a public offering, investors, issuers,
and their attorneys would no longer need to trace the history of
such securities.
Second, private placements may still serve some purpose
even under a company registration system. In particular, private
placements provide for reduced mandatory information disclo-
sure. Companies issuing securities under a private placement
need not assemble a formal registration statement, although
many will voluntarily provide similar information to attract in-
vestors. Furthermore, because investors are small in number and
the information disclosed is not required to be made public or
filed with the SEC, companies are often able to provide informa-
tion on a confidential basis.285 This allows companies to attract
investors to projects containing sensitive information in a man-
ner that such companies could not conduct in a public offering,
benefiting the capital markets and society as a whole.
Indeed, the Advisory Committee recognizes the benefit of
allowing even registrants in a full company system to make
"limited exemption" offerings to a few accredited investors.286
Under the limited exemption, issuers would be able to convey
confidential information to purchasers without filing such infor-
mation with the SEC. Nevertheless, the limited exemption is in-
ferior to retaining the current set of private placement exemp-
tions under a status-based antifraud rule for several reasons.
First, the limited exemption still provides a level of antifraud li-
ability that is different from registered transactions. Although
the Advisory Committee recommends that the liability provisions
of the Securities Act apply to limited exemption securities, 7 be-
cause Section 11 requires a registration statement and Section
'See Lisa K Bostwick, Note, The SEC Response to Internationalization and Institu-
tionalization: Rule 144A Merit Regulation of Investors, 27 L & Pol Intl Bus 423, 426
(1996) ("[Plrivate placements offer issuers many advantages over public offerings, espe-
cially opportunities for cost-effective, expedient, confidential, and flexible financing.");
Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1174 (cited in note 11) ([In private transactions the
purchaser, or its agents, has a greater opportunity to conduct 'hands-on' due diligence
and to receive private information (forecasts, estimates, and valuations) that the issuer
would feel uncomfortable including in a registration statement.").
'See text accompanying notes 200-05 (describing transaction exemptions to the Ad-
visory Committee's full and modified company registration system).
'See Advisory Committee Report at 102 (cited in note 13).
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12(a)(2) requires a prospectus-both of which are missing in a
limited exemption until the issuer makes full disclosure through
a Form 8-K-the limited exemption effectively provides issuers
with a reduced exposure to antifraud liability. Issuers, therefore,
would have an artificial incentive to avoid registering simply to
reduce their antifraud exposure; furthermore, as discussed
above,2" the difference in antifraud protection does not further
disclosure goals, at least for companies trading in an efficient
market. Second, the limited exemption does not include unac-
credited investors and thereby leaves significant numbers of in-
vestors out of the investment opportunities provided by private
placements. Although the current private placement exemptions
under Regulation D are mostly aimed at sophisticated investors,
some unsophisticated investors are able to participate." 9 Third,
because the limited exemption represents a new rule, it would
force all parties to incur uncertainty costs in working out the me-
chanics of the rule.
One final difference between the current private placement
system and the Advisory Committee's limited exemption is the
holding period requirement. Rather than subject the securities
sold in a limited exemption to any bright-line holding period, the
Advisory Committee simply restricts purchasers from making
sales of the exempted securities (or similarly priced securities)
until the issuer makes a public filing on the confidential informa-
tion (the public filing requirement). Note that both the current
private placement's holding period and the public filing require-
ment serve similar functions, imposing a liquidity penalty on un-
registered securities.29 ° Allowing private placements without re-
sale restrictions, for example, would undermine the public offer-
ing system from an ex ante perspective. Given the choice between
meeting the disclosure requirements of a public offering or con-
ducting a private placement, many companies would simply
choose the private placement and thereby avoid mandatory dis-
closure.291 Moreover, where private placements involve confiden-
See text accompanying notes 43-53.
'See Rule 505, Securities Act, 17 CFR § 230.505 (1996). Of course, some would argue
that cutting non-sophisticated investors out of private placements altogether would result
in fewer defrauded investors. Rational, non-sophisticated investors, however, can make
the choice themselves whether to partake of a private placement.
'See Bostwick, Note, 27 L & Pol Intl Bus at 428 (cited in note 285) (noting that issu-
ers in a private placement experience a ten to fifteen basis point illiquidity penalty).
"'Some commentators, however, argue that companies will voluntarily release infor-
mation to distinguish themselves from lower-quality companies. See Frank H. Easter-
brook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va
L Rev 669 (1984). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for
A Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va L Rev 717, 723 (1984) (arguing for a mandatory
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tial information, allowing free resale after a private placement
may result in the loss of investor confidence among nonpartici-
pating investors. In some sense, the confidential information
puts the private placement investors in a similar position as in-
siders. If they are allowed to freely trade their securities, other
investors in the market may lose confidence in the fairness of the
system. Investors, of course, may respond by discounting the
value of all securities. Managers, however, may nevertheless use
private placements as an indirect means to profit from insider
trading. If managers then adjust corporate information disclo-
sure or the corporate projects they undertake to take advantage
of this insider trading ability, then society is harmed. A resale
limitation reduces the risk of insider information trading. In-
deed, the logic of this argument calls for treating all the trades of
a private placement investor-whether in private placement or
registered securities-as suspect and therefore restricted.292
Nevertheless, the public filing resale requirement of the
limited exemption is inferior to the holding period requirement.
As a bright-line rule, the holding period requirement provides
more certainty for investors. Conversely, investors in the limited
exemption must rely on the issuer to make a public filing-
sometimes years after the initial purchase-in order to resell
their securities.293 Furthermore, by the very nature of the infor-
mation disclosed to investors in the limited exemption, outside
investors would face large hurdles in proving whether the public
filing requirement was actually met. Finally, most confidential
projects typically either resolve themselves during the two-year
holding period or have already become known to the market in
the time period.294
disclosure system).
'The Advisory Committee's limited exemption would restrict purchasers of securities
from trading not only the limited exemption securities but all other price-related securi-
ties of the issuer. See Advisory Committee Report at 102 (cited in note 13).
'Investors may obtain contractual guarantees from issuers; issuers, however, may
resist such guarantees to avoid putting the very information they intended to keep confi-
dential into the terms of the contract.
'Coffee similarly argues that a holding period will induce institutional investors to
take better care in evaluating and monitoring private placement investments, thereby
benefiting the entire capital market. See Coffee, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1183-84 (cited
in note 11) ("[Sbo long as some significant period of illiquidity remains, whether two years
or one, institutions that buy in private placements have a stronger incentive to monitor
and perform due diligence investigations than those that buy otherwise equivalent secu-
rities in public markets.").
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B. Substantive Company Registration
Given the SEC's recent interest in moving toward a formal
company registration system, a status-based antifraud regime
provides an important benefit: status-based liability achieves
most of the substantive benefits of the Advisory Committee's
company registration system with less disruption in the existing
regulatory structure. The primary benefit of the Advisory Com-
mittee's proposal is to extend shelf registration indefinitely. Even
here, however, it is unclear that relieving companies of the bur-
den to re-register securities for the shelf every two years provides
much benefit. As discussed in Section H.C, Form S-3 companies
can now approximate almost all the benefits of a company-based
registration system.295 Through incorporation by reference and
Rule 415 shelf offerings, S-3 companies may avoid most of the
strictures of the gun-jumping rules and offer securities on short
notice to the public. The main roadblock to achieving company
registration is not that companies lack the avenue to quickly and
inexpensively register securities under the Securities Act.
Company registration is undermined within the current sys-
tem by the many transaction exemptions to Section 5 that create
numerous, artificial distinctions between different securities of
the same issuer. The Advisory Committee's proposal, however,
does not completely eliminate this weakness in the current re-
gime. Even under the Advisory Committee's full company regis-
tration system, some companies may still choose, given the op-
portunity, to conduct a limited exemption placement or a non-
convertible debt private placement. Companies and investors
making the selection for an exemption lose liquidity, but gain the
benefits of reduced antifraud liability and truncated mandatory
disclosure. As discussed above, such transaction exemptions may
prove socially valuable to the extent more wealth-increasing con-
fidential projects are undertaken by firms.296 Nevertheless, the
availability of transaction exemptions-no matter how valuable
to society-weakens the company registration system and rein-
troduces the need for complex resale rules.
Some, therefore, may contend that a formal company regis-
tration system is essential to relieve issuers of the gun-jumping
restrictions and investors of the complex resale limitations
placed on restricted securities. However, a regime of status-based
antifraud rules for primary transactions coupled with a longer
'See Section H.C (describing the substantive shift in the Securities Act toward a
company registration system that has already occurred).
See text accompanying notes 281-94.
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shelf registration period would also relieve issuers and investors
of these burdens and at a lower uncertainty and transitional cost.
First, shelf registration already relieves issuers of the need to
comply with the gun-jumping rules except at periodic two-year
intervals when the issuers must re-register for the shelf. Ex-
tending the shelf registration period past the two-year mark will
further diminish the cost of the gun-jumping rules on shelf-
registration-eligible issuers.
Second, the magnitude of the complexity problems caused by
the resale limitations varies directly in proportion to the volume
of securities going through an exempt transaction. With status-
based antifraud liability rules combined with shelf registration,
however, the incentives to conduct an exempt offering are greatly
reduced. Only those issuers desiring to maintain some amount of
confidentiality in their information disclosures to particular in-
vestors will continue to use the exempt offering mechanism. No
longer will issuers choose a private placement because of its re-
duced antifraud liability; furthermore, shelf registration removes
the advantage of speed and low-transaction costs enjoyed by ex-
empt offerings. With both status-based antifraud liability and
shelf registration, in fact, investors will push issuers for registra-
tion to gain the benefit of liquidity. As the importance of exempt
transactions diminishes, the securities of most companies will
consist almost entirely of registered and liquid capital. Through
Exchange Act filings, all security holders will obtain updated in-
formation specific to the company. In substance, moving to a
status-based antifraud regime will result in the vast majority of
S-3 and S-2 companies mimicking company-registered capital
structures. For those few companies that choose nevertheless to
engage in a private placement and suffer the cost of illiquidity,
society will still benefit as both issuer and investor gain the bene-
fit of keeping sensitive company information in confidence. 9 '
CONCLUSION
Company registration is a concept whose time has come and
gone and now has come again. The first major efforts toward
company registration reform, culminating in the ALI model fed-
eral securities code, met with failure in the early 1980s. Ulti-
mately, many of company registration's substantive aspects
'Note that this argument does call for reducing the number of different transaction
exemptions in the current system to those absolutely necessary to allow companies to en-
gage in confidential wealth-increasing projects. Therefore, although Regulation D private
placements should be retained, the SEC and Congress may wish to consider eliminating
intrastate offering and Regulation A exemptions, among other exemptions.
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found expression in the current regime's integrated disclosure,
incorporation by reference, and shelf registration provisions. To-
day we face another movement to install a formal company regis-
tration system. As framed by the Advisory Committee, company
registration would incorporate not only formal company-centered
disclosure, but a whole host of peripheral reforms. At its core, the
Advisory Committee proposal's contribution is a continuous shelf
registration process. New Form C-1 registrants would gain the
ability to issue securities with only a minimal amount of transac-
tion and company-specific disclosure. Depending on the size and
type of the particular offering, companies could either file this in-
formation on a Form 8-K, as part of the registration statement,
or as a supplement to the prospectus. In either case, issuers us-
ing Form C-1 would avoid the cost, delay, and gun-jumping rules
associated with the current public registration process, much as
companies enjoying shelf registration do today on a more limited
scale.
Although containing many positive aspects, the Advisory
Committee proposal nevertheless leaves many issues and ques-
tions unanswered. For example, if company registration is justi-
fied for companies whose securities trade in an efficient market,
what of smaller companies trading in less efficient markets? The
transaction-specific aspects of the proposal that differentiate be-
tween different size offerings also add needless complexity to
company registration. Finally, it is unclear whether the periph-
eral reform proposals offered by the Committee-concerning top
management certification, due diligence duties, and enhanced
disclosure-are either warranted or necessary to a company reg-
istration system.
In response to the shortcomings of the Advisory Committee's
proposal, this Article suggests an alternative approach centered
around status-based antifraud liability. The Article recommends
varying the elements of antifraud liability, including materiality
(as embodied in the forward-looking safe harbor), scienter, and
third-party liability with the status of the company. Employing
these elements, this Article suggests the following antifraud sys-
tem: S-3 companies should enjoy Level III liability, providing for
a limited form of scienter-based liability regardless of the type of
primary transaction or document in question. Third-party associ-
ates would not face any legal liability and forward-looking state-
ments would enjoy broad safe harbor protection under Level III
liability. S-2 companies and their third-party associates would
face Level II liability, consisting of negligence-based liability with
an intermediate forward-looking statement safe harbor. Finally,
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S-1 companies would bear the highest form of antifraud liability,
Level I liability. Under Level I liability, issuers and their identi-
fied third-party associates would face strict liability and enjoy
only a restricted scope safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments.29 In the case of private placements where investors may
possess more sophistication, moreover, one possible transaction-
based addition to the status-approach advocated in this Article is
perhaps warranted: The level of liability on Form S-1 companies
should be mitigated to Level J- liability to take into account the
ability of sophisticated investors to account better for the risk of
fraud.
This status-based liability scheme provides two benefits over
the current system and the Advisory Committee's proposals.
First, antifraud liability would be applied where it is most
needed. Form S-3 companies face a greater array of alternative
market-based antifraud devices than do S-1 companies.
Managers of S-3 companies realize that more public information
surrounds their company, restricting their ability to misstate the
value of the company. Greater numbers of third parties acting as
gatekeepers or certifiers can also assess the value of larger, more
well known companies able to spread the fixed cost of such
services across a greater number of shareholders. Where these
market-based mechanisms reduce the amount of fraud-and
therefore the gain-from employing more antifraud legal liabil-
ity, reducing antifraud liability becomes more justified for S-3
companies. Furthermore, S-3 companies-which tend to be
larger, have deeper pockets, and engage in larger issues of secu-
rities-are at greater risk from frivolous litigation that may ac-
company higher levels of antifraud liability.
Second, a status-based antifraud regime would, in effect,
lead the current system to the same substantive result as a com-
pany registration regime. The institution of the current shelf
registration system in 1983 dramatically reduced the costs to S-3
companies of going public. In fact, the primary advantage of pri-
vate placements and other exempt transactions lies in their re-
duced antifraud liability. With a status-based antifraud regime,
however, this distortive advantage is removed. Without this ad-
vantage, most eligible companies will voluntarily select a shelf of-
fering, extending the coverage of Securities Act registration to
the vast majority of companies and securities. Conversely, com-
panies would still be allowed to conduct a private placement to
'For an outline of Level I-II liability, see Part I.C.
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obtain financing for confidential projects, unlike the full company
registration system.
This Article has set forth the basics of a status-based anti-
fraud regime. Although placing more liability on smaller, lesser
known companies may seem "unfair," it is no more unfair than
denying the lesser known companies the ability to conduct shelf-
offerings or the ability to incorporate by reference. Moreover, to-
day's current system, which places the same liability on all com-
panies regardless of size, market capitalization, or access to
market-based antifraud mechanisms, could be considered unfair
and distortive from a societal perspective. Although other alter-
natives to the antifraud regime proposed in this Article are pos-
sible, status-based antifraud remains the best means to continue
the legacy of Milton Cohen.

